Railroads, Their Regulation, and Its Effect on Efficiency and Competition by McKenzie, Taylor
RAILROADS, THEIR REGULATION, AND ITS EFFECT ON EFFICIENCY AND
COMPETITION
by
TAYLOR KLAGES MCKENZIE
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Department of Economics
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
June 2017
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE
Student: Taylor Klages McKenzie
Title: Railroads, Their Regulation, and Its Effect on Efficiency and Competition
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Economics by:
Wesley W. Wilson Chair
Van Kolpin Core Member
Keaton Miller Core Member
Jeremy Piger Core Member
Diane Del Guercio Institutional Representative
and
Scott L. Pratt Dean of the Graduate School
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.
Degree awarded June 2017
ii
c© 2017 Taylor Klages McKenzie
iii
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Taylor Klages McKenzie
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2017
Title: Railroads, Their Regulation, and Its Effect on Efficiency and Competition
Railroads have been subject to federal regulation since 1887. Due to the development
of competing modes of transportation and changes in types of products being shipped,
regulation began to impede efficiency and viability of firms, leading to partial deregulation
of the industry in 1980. Partial deregulation allowed railroads to reduce costs, notably
through mergers and line abandonment, which were aggressively pursued following
deregulation and led to dramatic efficiency gains. However, concerns remain over increased
consolidation, lack of competition in the industry, and the ability of firms to continue to
realize efficiency gains. This dissertation investigates more recent developments in the rail
industry with an eye towards regulation’s effect and role.
I begin with a study into the markups of price over marginal cost and elasticities
of scale in the rail industry. Scale elasticities provide information on where firms are
operating on their average cost curves, and markups provide a more theoretically
appealing method of examining pricing behavior than the revenue-to-variable-cost measure
currently used by regulators. I extend previously developed methods to identify markups
and scales for each firm and in each year. I find prices well in excess of marginal cost, and
evidence firms are operating near minimum efficient scale, indicating efficiency gains from
deregulation may be fully realized.
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I then present a study that examines productivity changes in the rail industry
and the role of technological change. I extend stochastic frontier frameworks to allow
productivity and the state of technology to evolve flexibly through time and vary across
firms. I find firms turn towards technological innovation to realize productivity gains when
other channels previously offered by deregulation are not available.
I finish with a study of allocative errors in the rail industry. I again extend a
stochastic frontier model to include differences in production across firms and allow
allocative errors to be correlated with competitive pressures. I find that incorporating
flexibility into the description of firm production is crucial for obtaining unbiased
estimates of allocative errors, overcapitalization is prevalent in the rate-regulated rail
industry, and additional competition does not appear to reduce inefficiency.
This dissertation includes unpublished co-authored material.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The railroad industry has had a long history of regulation that once promoted
competition but over time, changes in the types of products being shipped and
development of competing modes of transportation came to impede efficiency and
innovation. Eventually, this led to bankruptcies and concerns about economic viability.
While deregulation of the industry has certainly resulted in efficiency gains and the
survival of the industry, massive consolidation and abandonment of unprofitable routes
has resulted in less competition between firms and has left many shippers with few
transportation options. This dissertation investigates the railroad industry in the context
of its regulation to determine the gains earned through partial deregulation as well as
negative effects caused by reduced competition.
This dissertation begins with an analysis of markups and scale elasticities for
railroads that have differentiated networks that was co-authored with University of
Oregon professor Dr. Wesley Wilson. Using a random coefficients framework, I extend
the model of Klette (1999) to allow markups and scales to vary flexibly both across firms
and through time and estimate the model using Bayesian methods. I find evidence that
price significantly exceeds marginal costs and scale estimates that point to constant or
increasing returns to scale. Further, I find that there are important differences in markups
and scales both across firms and over time. Increases in track investment created excess
capacity and increased returns to scale for Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and
CSX; while BNSF has maintained investment and its excess capacity, CSX appears to
have filled its excess capacity by 2012.
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I then present a study analyzing productivity changes in the railroad industry and
decompose them into changes due to technological change and those due to other factors
such as rail line abandonment. I extend the stochastic frontier framework to include time-
varying parameters to both allow productivity to follow a flexible process unique to each
railroad and to capture changes in the production technology over time and again estimate
the model from a Bayesian approach. I first find that productivity has shown little growth
in the industry since 1999, with the exception of the Canadian National railway (CN)
and the Kansas City Southern railway (KCS), which both experienced sizable increases in
productivity. The source of productivity growth varies across firms. On the one hand,
BNSF, the Soo Line railway, and Union Pacific (UP) were all able to realize growth
through innovations in production, but had little ability to increase productivity through
other channels. On the other hand, firms like CN and KCS that still had the ability to
abandon lines found large increases in productivity due to factors other than innovation,
but tended to stagnate or even experience losses with respect to changes in the production
technology.
Finally, in the third essay, I examine whether there are allocative inefficiencies and
the effects of competitive pressures on allocative errors. As noted by Tsionas (2002),
it is important to control for differences in productive capabilities across firms when
estimating technical inefficiency because those differences would otherwise be attributed
to how efficiently firms can transform inputs into output. Similarly, differences in input
productivity across firms will have an impact on how errors in allocation of inputs are
estimated; however, I am not aware of any published research that investigates the
importance of incorporating differences in production across firms in obtaining unbiased
estimated of allocative inefficiency. Next, as noted by Leibenstein (1966), firms that don’t
face sufficient competition may not only lack the incentive to keep prices low but also to
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minimize costs, resulting in so-called “X-inefficiencies.” Precise allocation of inputs can
reduce production costs, which can be important when firms face competition; however,
firms that don’t face competitive pressure don’t need to rely on low costs of production
to attract customers and may invest less in the allocative process. After conducting a
review of the history of the industry and the literature relevant to study of inefficiency
and its application to the railroad industry, I also develop and present my models that
test for the importance of controlling for differences in production and for the existence
of X-inefficiencies. I find that it is crucial to allow production to vary flexibly across firms
to obtain consistent estimates of inefficiency, and that increased market power appears
to decrease allocative errors on average, providing evidence against the existence of X-
inefficiencies in the rail industry.
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CHAPTER II
MARKUPS AND SCALE ELASTICITIES FOR DIFFERENTIATED RAIL
NETWORKS
This chapter was co-authored with University of Oregon professor Dr. Wesley Wilson. Dr.
Wilson provided initial motivation for this project and was instrumental with his in-depth
institutional knowledge of the rail industry. From this impetus I extended the theoretical
and empirical methodology to provide more granular analysis of markups and scales than
any published of which I’m aware. I also carried out statistical estimation and wrote this
chapter using those results.
Abstract
In this chapter, I develop and estimate a model that provides both markups and scale
elasticities that vary across railroads and through time for the traffic on their networks.
My model is based on a framework provided by Hall (1988) and Klette (1999) wherein
markups and scale elasticities are estimated from production relations. In my model, I
aggregate the shipments over each firm’s network, which provides a mapping from inputs
and network and shipment characteristics to aggregate outputs over the network. Markups
and scale elasticities are taken to follow a multivariate distribution. This allows for
differences in markups and scale across firms and through time, but also for covariances
across firms in markups and scale. I estimate the model with Bayesian methods to find
markups that are generally well in excess of marginal costs and scale elasticities that
generally point to increasing or constant returns in the industry.
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“With 90% of U.S. rail freight now controlled by only four
companies, shippers claim the giants have unfairly banded
together. Unapologetic railroads refuse to back down. An epic
battle of business vs. business.” (Fortune, March 16, 2015)
Introduction
The rail industry was in financial ruin in the 1970s, which led to partial deregulation
of the industry in 1980. Since then, there have been tremendous declines in railroad costs
and prices and increases in productivity. Indeed, the reversal over the last 35 years has
been so successful that many are now concerned that the industry charges rates larger
than what is necessary to recoup costs and that firms are earning excessive profits. While
there have been a considerable number of studies that examine costs and prices, there are
few, if any, studies that examine railroad markups.
Railroads each operate over massive and differentiated networks that each have
different shippers, products, and operating characteristics. Over the network, they serve a
multitude of markets, making standard empirical models of markups intractable. Instead,
I develop a model of markups and scale elasticities based on the seminal work of Hall
(1988) and Klette (1999) and introduce Bayesian methods to estimate the model. This
model estimates rail specific markups, which can be interpreted as the average markup
generated from traffic for each firm’s network.1 It also provides direct estimates of scale
elasticities. In both cases, the Bayesian estimation provides distributions of markups and
scales that are allowed to drift over time and vary across railroads. Further, this approach
also allows for the correlation of markups and scale elasticities across firms that provide
insight into industry structure. I find that railroad markups are well in excess of marginal
1These methods use a local mean value theorem approximation centered around the representative
firm in each year, which can provide more accurate results than methods that assume a global functional
form such as a Cobb-Douglas production function. However, this approximation is only accurate locally
and thus cannot be used to evaluate total costs or examine minimum rates needed for firm viability.
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costs and that most firms are operating with near constant returns to scale at most points
in time.
The railroad industry has been federally regulated since 1887 and was partially
deregulated in 1980. In the 1800s, there was high demand for rail transportation and
few substitutes. During this period, the rail network grew reaching a maximum size
in the early 1900s. Much of the existing network today is the result of this growth.
However, due to the nature of railroad production and costs that include large fixed
factor investments, the market has a tendency to be highly concentrated, especially on a
local level (MacDonald and Cavalluzzo, 1996). The effects of concentrated transportation
markets have long been a focus of regulators, and emphasis has been put on balancing
efficiency advantage of large railroads with the harm caused by non-competitive pricing
and shipper captivity (Boyer, 1987).
As the industry evolved and competing forms of transportation such as barges and
trucks were introduced, there were dramatic changes to the structure of the industry
and the regulations that govern it. In particular, innovations in transportation and
changes in the types of goods being shipped led to a significant decrease in the demand
for railroad transportation. Further, under regulation firms were slow to adjust and were
unproductive. By the 1970s, the industry was failing financially and there were many
highly publicized bankruptcies. The economic viability of the industry along with a failed
regulatory regime led to partial deregulation of the industry with passage of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act in 1976 and the Staggers Rail Act in 1980.
The number of firms has fallen dramatically following deregulation, the rail network
held by the Class I carriers has shrunk, shipments are traveling longer distances, and
more shippers find themselves with few shipping options. These changes have certainly
improved the efficiency and viability of railroads, but there remain many concerns that
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firms are price discriminating and charging excessive rates to many shippers (Wilson and
Bitzan, 2003). While the remaining regulation over the industry has the power to limit
excessive prices and non-competitive behavior, many sources have pointed to regulatory
efficacy that is lacking both in its theoretical basis and in its execution.2
There are many studies that evaluate competition and structure in the railroad
industry. These studies have highlighted the shortcomings of regulatory tools currently
in use and have had success in determining important factors in production, modeling
costs, and describing railroad operations. The most recent studies have continued
with estimating costs of specific shipments and beginning to examine markers of non-
competitive behavior and firm viability. Many studies have also looked towards precisely
explaining differences in prices using detailed data describing costs and competitiveness.3
Still, to my knowledge, there are few, if any, published studies that evaluate and
consistently estimate both pricing behavior and scale of production; such research
would provide insight into the structure of production and competition as well as non-
competitive pricing.
This paper begins by covering the history of the railroad industry, its growth and
regulation, the effects of partial deregulation, and the current state of the industry
and regulation. I then highlight several methods from the industrial organization
literature that look to evaluate structure, efficiency, and competition within an industry
and consider the strengths and shortcomings of each. Among these methods are the
2Specifically, current regulatory practices compare revenue to variable costs to evaluate firm viability
and excessive rates, but the methods used to estimate variable costs have been subject to significant
criticism. Many studies have identified both broad and specific shortcomings in regulation, for further
reading see Boyer (1987), MacDonald and Cavalluzzo (1996), Burton (1993), Winston et al. (1990).
3Most of these studies use waybill data and reduced form models to describe prices; unfortunately,
these reduced form models fail to estimate parameters that are fundamental to firm behavior and can
therefore produce inconsistent estimates and results. For further reading, see Casavant et al. (2012),
Schmidt (2001), and Barnekov and Kleit (1990).
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production-focused models developed by Solow (1957), Hall (1988), and Klette (1999),
which I draw on and extend in this analysis. I continue on to describe how production
and costs of railroads have been modeled in the literature and determine factors that are
important to describing railroad operations.
This research goes on to derive a theoretical model of railroad production beginning
with a commonly used specification of production. I then obtain an expression for firm
output that involves firms’ markups of price over marginal cost, scale elasticities, and
network characteristics. Using this model and data from the United States Surface
Transportation Board, I estimate two empirical models. The first, which replicates the
methods of Hall (1988) and Klette (1999), assumes that markups and scales to production
are constant across railroads and time. The results of this model give some evidence of
deviations of price from marginal cost and production beyond minimum efficient scale in
the industry.
I then propose a random-coefficients version of this model that allows for firm- and
year-specific markups and scales, correlation among markups and scales across firms,
and a central tendency for these parameters that varies flexibly through time.4 Using
Bayesian methods, I estimate this model and obtain density estimates of markups and
scale elasticities. This method allows me to evaluate pricing behavior and scale economies
for each firm and in each year and additionally provides information about the structure
of the industry and the nature of competition between railroads through correlations in
markups and scales. The results from this model provide evidence of significant markups
of price over marginal cost and production near minimum efficient scale for most Class I
railroads.
4Due to stark differences in the scope and scale of operations across railroads, it would not be
surprising to find significant heterogeneity in pricing and returns to scale across firms. Further, though
the industry has been relatively stable since 2001, investment in infrastructure and other operational
changes could lead to variability in markups and scale elasticities across time.
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Background
This section provides a brief history of the railroad industry, its regulation and
partial deregulation, and how the industry has responded to these changes. The first
subsection describes the beginning of the industry, the movement for its regulation, and
the regulatory policies that were introduced. The second subsection describes how the
industry changed over the 20th century as new forms of transportation were introduced,
the impetus for deregulation of the industry, and how the it has changed after its partial
deregulation. I also describe current regulatory practices, concerns over their efficacy, and
worries that partial deregulation has made discriminatory pricing more common.
A Brief History of Railroads and Their Regulation
The railroad industry is one of the nation’s oldest, and as the industry has grown
and evolved, so has our understanding of how these firms compete and how to best
regulate them. At the industry’s beginning, railroads were massively successful. Not
only was rail transportation much faster and more comfortable than previously existing
modes, but it was effectively the only option for traveling long distances in a reasonable
amount of time (Brown, 2013). Further, the ability to quickly transport goods and raw
materials across the country allowed for rapid expansion of other industries like agriculture
and energy production. As a result, railroads faced large demand for their service and the
industry thrived.
At the same time, economic theory describing firm competition was growing
and shifting as economists began considering failures in perfect competition and the
consequences thereof (Brown, 2013). Leading thinkers in the area realized the extent of
social damage that monopolies and other forms of imperfect competition can cause and
began to seek regulation in industries where competition was evidently less prevalent.
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Additionally, economists also began to recognize that firms in some industries might be
able to realize economies of scale and increase efficiency by increasing their size. Given
the large sunk capital investments in the industry and the vast amount of overlapping
rail networks that resulted from decades of fierce competition, railroads were able to
supply their service at a lower cost by combining or cooperating. This consolidation led
to increased local market concentration and seller captivity, which allowed firms to more
easily charge non-competitive rates.
Following this discussion, ideas about railroad regulation began to shift. As Brown
(2013) states, prior to these realizations, “laissez-faire doctrines held that monopoly as an
economic problem originated with explicit grants by governments to firms or individuals.”
The solution to these types of monopolies is clearly to reduce government involvement
and purge the source of monopoly. However, in the case of the rail industry where local
monopolies were more likely to emerge naturally, solutions had not been fully examined.
At the same time, many shippers were exceedingly concerned about discriminatory and
unfair pricing for railroad services. The Granger movement to regulate railroad operations
began in Iowa and was the result of excessive rates being charged to less serviced shippers
(Miller, 1954). Many farmers subsequently found that their operations were no longer
viable under high shipping rates and it became necessary to control the prices charged by
railroads. Many regulators like Cooley (1884) recognized the need to balance efficiency
gains that would be realized from a natural monopoly and the social harm that can be
inflicted by excessive rates and discriminatory pricing.
Regulation of railroads began with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA) of 1887. This act and its successors allowed for significant oversight of railroad
operations, including authority over rates charged, entry into and exit from the industry,
and mergers. Specifically, the ICA made it explicit that railroads were legally bound
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to providing services at reasonable rates and without undue discrimination in prices or
availability of services. The ICA also established the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), which provided regulatory oversight of railroads, and the Elkins Act, Hepburn Act,
and Mann-Elkins Act of the early 1900s further strengthened regulation and the abilities
of the ICC to enforce those regulations; by 1920, the ICC was able to set minimum and
maximum rates, preside over and even encourage mergers, and control and punish collusive
behavior (Keeler, 1983). These regulations improved outcomes for shippers and railroads
alike; excessive rates were abolished, shipper coverage increased, rate wars and excessive
competition between firms diminished, and railroad profits tended to improve.
Partial Deregulation and Its Effect on the Industry
As the 20th century progressed, rail transportation waned in popularity with the
introduction and improvement of competing forms of transportation such as barges,
trucks, and airplanes. As these new technologies were adopted, competition in the rail
industry changed dramatically; demand for rail transportation fell,5 the market became
much less viable for firms, and the regulations put in place in the early part of the
century became less relevant and arguably hindered efficiency in the industry (Keeler,
1983). There were not only many concerns about the difficulty and cost of implementing
regulation but also about how those regulations made it difficult for firms to remain viable
by, for example, forcing railroads to continue operating on routes that were massively
unprofitable (Waters, 2007). In response to worries about the future of firms and stability
of the industry, the government began to deregulate the railroads, primarily with the
passage of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of 1976, which
5This drop in demand can be attributed both to shippers substituting other modes of transportation
for rail shipments and a change in the types of products being shipped. With the introduction of plastics
came shipments that were lighter on average, resulting in fewer revenue ton miles.
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reduced price regulation and made it easier for firms to enter and exit the market, and
the passage of the Staggers Act of 1980, which further reduced regulations on pricing and
mergers.
The major effect of partial deregulation of the railroad industry was allowing firms
to set their own rates with minimal ICC control for most commodities. Instead, the ICC
exercises control over movements it deems to be market dominant, defined as a movement
where the ratio of revenue to variable costs exceeded a given threshold.6 Movements that
fit this criterion are then investigated by the ICC to determine if competition among
railroads is present and if the rates charged are “reasonable”. The prices charged to a
given shipper are determined to be unreasonable if they exceed the stand-alone cost of
servicing only that shipper. The ICC rests the burden of proof on shippers; in order to
demonstrate unfair rates, the shipper must construct a hypothetical railroad and show
that the cost of servicing the shipper is greater than the rate charged. While stand-
alone costs exclude the variable and separable fixed costs of servicing other shippers, they
include the common costs of supporting an entire railroad network, which decrease as the
railroad services more shippers. As a result, rates charged by a stand-alone railroad would
necessarily be “absurdly high” because they largely ignore economies of scope and scale,
and very few shippers would be able to demonstrate that rates are unreasonable (Roberts,
1983). While this regulatory policy has been heavily scrutinized and criticized, it remains
today as the primary tool for identifying and penalizing non-competitive pricing.
The Staggers Act further set minimum rates at average variable cost and allowed
railroads to more easily abandon routes and merge with one another (Winston et al.,
1990). These regulatory changes had a dramatic effect on the structure and operations
of the industry; massive consolidation resulted in the number of firms decreasing from 40
6This threshold began at 1.6 but is currently 1.8.
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in 1980 to seven in 1999, abandonment of routes led to a 57.8% decrease in miles of road
between 1980 and 2013, and the average length of haul increased appreciably from 615
miles in 1980 to 973 in 2013 (AAR, 2013). The effects of these changes are clearly seen
in the time series of output and network size, as shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Following
partial deregulation in 1980, railroads began abandoning unprofitable routes, leading
to a massive decrease in the total amount of network operated by Class I railroads. At
the same time, due to efficiency gains, the total output of Class I railroads grew as costs
fell. Given the massive consolidation in the industry, the average railroad’s network grew
sizeably through 1999, by which time all major consolidations had occurred. Since 1999,
network size has remained relatively constant, illustrating a stabilization of the industry.
These regulatory changes not only had a large effect on the industry but also achieved
many of their goals; operating costs per ton mile fell by 60% between 1980 and 1998,
return on equity increased from 3% to 10.7%, and shippers have benefited from lower
rates, more reliable service, and faster shipment times (Peltzman and Winston, 2000).7
While it initially appears that partial deregulation has provided an improvement
for railroads and shippers alike, there are still many concerns about non-competitive
pricing behavior, especially in captive markets. Anecdotal evidence of harm to captive
shippers is compelling, with shippers noting that “when you’re captive to one of these
railroads, the idea of negotiating a contract is pretty laughable” (Bowman, 2013). Recent
research has found similar trends; the number of captive shippers has been increasing since
deregulation, and railroads appear to be exerting market power to charge higher rates,
especially when shippers have few transportation options to choose from. Henrickson and
Wilson (2014) find that rates can be as much as 13.9% lower when shippers have access to
7Winston et al. (1990) found that the benefit to shippers from changes in regulatory policy was
approximately $12 billion annually in 1999.
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multiple methods of transportation, pointing to the market dominance and discriminatory
pricing policies of many railroads.
There have also been many concerns over regulatory efficacy. The Christensen
report, a study commissioned by the United States Surface Transportation Board (STB),
examined competition in the rail markets in the period that followed partial deregulation
of the industry. Laurits R. Christensen Associates, Inc. (2009) first found major flaws in
the methods regulators use to identify non-competitive behavior. The report found that
the STB’s policy of using the ratio of revenue to variable costs of individual movements
as an indicator of market dominance was flawed for two reasons. First, the study found
evidence that methods used to estimate variable cost for a given movement were not
theoretically sound and produced poor results; estimates of the ratio of revenue to variable
cost ranged anywhere from over 300% to paradoxically below 100%. Additionally, the
Christensen report found that the constructed ratio of revenue to variable costs was only
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weakly correlated with more preferred measures of market captivity and dominance. As a
result, the report recommended an overhaul in the methods used by the STB to identify
non-competitive behavior, noting that “more appropriate measures of captivity should
focus on the effects of the transportation market structure on rail rates and, by extension,
markups” (Laurits R. Christensen Associates, Inc., 2009). While many studies have
estimated cost functions that are used to obtain markup estimates, I am not aware of any
published work that directly estimates markups and scale elasticities through estimation of
the production technology.
Literature Review
This section highlights existing literature related to modeling railroad operations and
evaluating structure and competition. Since there is little research that directly evaluates
the competitive behavior of railroads, this review separately focuses on methods used
to evaluate structure and identify non-competitive behavior and those used to model
railroad operations and production. The first subsection examines the extensive literature
in industrial organization that has developed many tools to evaluate the structure of
industries and the conduct of firms and identifies a model that is appropriate for the
study of railroads. The second subsection focuses on research that has modeled railroad
operations and determines which factors are important to describing costs and production
of railroads.
Identifying Non-competitive Behavior
The field of industrial organization has had a long history of evaluating competition
between firms, beginning with Mason’s industry studies, continuing with many inter-
industry studies of the 1950s and 1960s, and culminating in the development of methods
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used to evaluate competition and pricing behavior within an industry (Schmalensee, 2012).
As the field has matured, theory describing competition between firms and more robust
statistical methods needed to consistently estimate these models have been developed and
successfully used. These studies tend to either investigate the type of competition between
firms or estimate observable markers of competition, such as the ratio of price to marginal
costs. Several of these models have been criticized for their lack of theoretical basis or
difficulty in estimation. Other methods, however, have been shown to produce consistent
and credible estimates when applied appropriately.
Kadiyahi et al. (2001) provides a broad exposition into several methods of estimating
the form of competition and highlights the successes and failures of each. One method,
colloquially known as the menu approach, estimates a statistical model that nests several
theoretical competitive models and performs statistical tests on parameters that coincide
with each type of competition. Unfortunately, the conclusions of this method were often
seemingly paradoxical; it is possible that one might either fail to reject hypotheses of
exclusive forms of competition or, in a more troubling circumstance, one might reject
hypotheses of all types of competition built into the model. In either case, the result is
not particularly illuminative, and it can be difficult to make policy recommendations based
on these conclusions.
Another more frequently used method, which includes the conjectural variations
approach, focuses on estimating parameters that will provide indications of competition.
Corts (1999) uses a conduct parameter in his analysis that describes the extent to
which firms set prices above marginal cost. The theoretical value of this conjectural
variation can be calculated for several forms of competition and compared to actual
estimates. Unfortunately, this approach suffers from the same blight that affected the
menu approach; it’s entirely possible that one could fail to reject multiple hypotheses of
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conflicting types of competition, and it’s also possible that one could reject hypotheses
of all forms of competition built into the model. Further, this approach typically
requires estimating both demand and supply functions, raising possible concerns over
specification errors as well as any problems associated with estimating of systems of
equations like endogeneity and instrument choice. However, since this approach treats
firm conduct as a continuous variable, the results of these models can offer some idea of
how “uncompetitively” firms behave; still, this interpretation has faced criticism because it
fails to accurately model the exact form of competition between firms.
Current research has began to favor estimating an indicator of competition, as in
the conduct parameter approach, but has focused on making that analysis more robust.
Specifically, attention has turned towards estimating the ratio of price to marginal cost,
commonly referred to as the markup and focuses less on describing the exact form of
competition. Since perfectly competitive firms set price equal to marginal cost, one can
establish a competitive benchmark and compare this with estimates of firm markups;
markups significantly greater than one indicate deviation from competitive behavior.
There have been several methods developed to estimate markups; these models either
estimate models of cost and demand or consumer preferences directly, or estimate
production functions to find marginal costs and use an assumption of profit maximization
to obtain markup estimates.
Berry et al. (1995) examines markups by estimating a model of costs and a flexible
model of consumer preferences. The authors develop a model of consumer preferences
that allows for preference heterogeneity and aggregate decisions to the market level. Using
product characteristics and time series for sales, the authors estimate the distribution
of individual consumer preferences and derive a measure of aggregate demand for each
product as well as hypothetical products. The authors additionally develop a model of
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costs for multiproduct firms and pair it with their model of aggregate demands to obtain
markup estimates. It is important to note that this model requires well-defined definitions
of markets and an assumption of Bertrand competition in each market to obtain consistent
estimates. The authors apply their model to automobile markets; not only do estimates
provide information about demand such as preferences for certain characteristics and cross
price elasticities, but they also provide reasonable markup estimates, ranging from 18.4%
for the Nissan Sentra to 48.4% for the Lexus LS400 (Berry et al., 1995).
Rather than relying on estimating a cost function and model of demand directly,
many studies have looked towards using variability in productivity to explain costs, which
can then be used to obtain more robust estimates of the ratio of price to marginal cost by
limiting problems that can occur in demand estimation. Solow (1957) set the groundwork
for this type of analysis by noting that given the assumption that firms have Hicks neutral
demand, output can be expressed in terms of input prices, technological growth, and
productivity of the various inputs. Solow used his results for a macroeconomic analysis
of how technological change and labor productivity has evolved over time in the United
States and was able to determine the average rate of technological change and how much
of the growth in aggregate output was due to these technological improvements. Hall
(1988) recognized that this type of analysis would be enormously valuable if carried out
at the industry level; he extends Solow’s theory to describe individual firms and estimates
the relationship between input usage and output separately for a number of industries.
Hall further derives a method of estimating the markup of price over marginal cost
using Solow’s estimation framework. Hall (1988) found markup estimates that generally
matched expectations. For example, the markup on non-durable goods was estimated to
be approximately 104% greater than the markup on durable goods, likely because of the
relatively low elasticity of demand for the former.
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Klette (1999) further extended and solidified Hall’s contributions. Klette follows
Solow and Hall by assuming a Hicks neutral production process for firms. However, Klette
goes on to make several important original contributions. First, rather than using a Taylor
approximation as in Solow and Hall, Klette uses a mean value theorem approximation.
Since variables in this analysis include individual firm output and input usage, which
can vary wildly across an industry, linear Taylor approximations, which are accurate
around the point they are centered but less so away from that point, tend to perform
poorly. The mean value theorem approximation, on the other hand, is “a priori suitable
for samples with any magnitude of cross sectional differences in output, productivity, and
inputs” (Klette, 1999). Next, it is possible that firms might experience different input
qualities and therefore different input prices; capturing this variation in input quality
and prices is important to properly identify productivity differences across firms. Finally,
while Klette measures average parameter values and markups and scale elasticities for
various industries similar to Hall’s results, he also develops and utilizes a framework
to estimate the distribution of firm markups, a result that would enormously useful in
regulating industries. Additionally, Klette’s econometric approach appears to produce
more reasonable estimates of markups than did Hall’s; Klette’s markup estimates were
generally between 1 and 1.1, while many of Hall’s estimates were greater than 2 and many
exceeded 3.
Modeling Railroad Operations
Describing the functions, costs, and operations of railroads is difficult for a number
of reasons. First, unlike many other extensively studied industries, railroads produce
many types of outputs; not only are there many different commodities that railroads
ship, but firms also serve many shippers that want their goods transported to many
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different locations. Modeling railroad operations for each of these outputs would be
onerous even with complete data; unfortunately, only aggregate measures of output are
typically observed, such as the total number of tons shipped. Further, given the scope
of railroad operations, it can be arduous to accurately describe the cost of transporting
goods.8 Not only do costs depend on direct factors like use of a locomotive or consumption
of fuel, but also on indirect factors that control operation and coordination of movements
along a railroad’s network. Finally, since railroads serve many geographically separated
points on their networks and since many inputs to production aren’t sufficiently divisible,
many markets experience varying amounts of excess capacity, giving rise to very complex
pricing behavior to cover the cost of excess capacity. Many techniques and methods have
been developed and refined to more accurately describe railroad operations, costs, and
productive capabilities.
Describing output of railroads, especially aggregated output, has been a long
standing problem in the study of the industry. Given the many outputs that firms
produce that depend on both the commodity shipped and the origin and destination of
the shipment, one would ideally use completely disaggregated data that contain amounts
of each commodity shipped, rates charged, and complete information for each movement
across the network to identify all factors that influence costs. However, given the difficulty
in obtaining this data, few studies investigating individual movements across railroad
networks have been conducted. Notably, Wilson and Bitzan (2003) use disaggregated
industry data to investigate the costs of individual rail movements and had success in
using this data to estimate shipment specific costs over time. Using properties about
shipments, these methods can be used to find, for example, marginal shipping costs for
various commodity groups that depend on location and other shipment characteristics.
8This is made even more difficult when working with aggregated data since shipment specific
characteristics can’t be directly controlled for.
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However, complete disaggregated data concerning railroad operations has not been
available historically and is currently confidential, so most studies have relied on using
aggregated data instead.
Given the complexity of outputs that railroads produce, identifying an appropriate
measure of aggregate output was a focal concern in early studies. Studies have used many
different measurements of railroad output, but eventually researchers, recognizing the
importance of both weight and distance traveled, predominantly began using revenue
ton-miles, defined as one ton that generates revenue shipped one mile, as a measure of
output (Waters, 2007). Collapsing rich data describing highly specific measures of output
into this aggregate measure of output discards a wealth of information, making it difficult
to accurately describe the relationship of costs and aggregate output and necessary to
consider many factors when modeling costs and production. Specifically, total revenue
ton miles reflect flows of shipments over the railroad’s network, but due to the nature of
its aggregation, its effect on costs is clearly correlated with other characteristics of the
railroad’s network. For example, since coordination of movements necessarily becomes
more difficult as a railroad’s network size increases, the marginal cost of revenue ton miles
will depend on network size. Friedlaender and Spady (1981) identified major factors
of railroad costs and labeled them as fixed inputs, variable inputs, and technological
conditions. Variable inputs include labor as well as use of equipment and fuel, the fixed
input was total value of track, measured using replacement costs, was used as the fixed
input, and technological conditions were described with characteristics of the railroad’s
network such as network size, average length of haul, and the mix of various commodities
being shipped. It is crucial to include these factors as well as properly specify how each
works together to produce output in order to obtain consistent estimates of production
and costs.
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In addition to determining the factors that affect output and costs, researchers
have struggled with describing the shape and functional form of costs and production.
Researchers began by using familiar functional forms that are relatively easy to work
with; for example, Keeler (1974) uses Cobb-Douglas production function that accounts
for both inputs used and network characteristics to estimate returns to scale and density
of railroads. Recognizing the restrictiveness of assuming particular functional forms,
many researchers have had success in estimating more flexible cost function forms
such as the translog form; these studies have generally found that using flexible forms
that relax important assumptions like subadditivity yield more accurate results and
predictions (Waters, 2007). Overall, researchers have seen success in using more flexible
functional approximations to describe production and costs, and, fundamentally, many
approximations such as higher order Taylor approximations, log-linearization, and mean
value theorem approximations could also be used.
Running parallel to the field of industrial organization, research of railroad
operations and competition has focused on estimating the markup of price over marginal
cost as an indicator of competitive behavior. In order to identify railroad markups,
researchers must fundamentally have a model of costs to derive an estimate of marginal
costs and a model of market demand to identify equilibrium prices.9 Railroad studies have
largely focused on simultaneously estimating cost functions and demand relations (Waters,
2007). To my knowledge, no production based methods for estimating markups like those
found in Hall (1988) and Klette (1999) have been applied to the railroad industry.
Notably, researchers have used conduct parameter approaches like those proposed in
Corts (1999), and some have focused on more robust demand estimation like that found
9While costs must generally be estimated to obtain estimates of markups, assumptions about
demand can range from complex specifications that estimate preferences to simple assumptions like profit
maximization.
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in Berry et al. (1995). Specifically, Ivaldi and McCullough (2005) assumes heterogeneous
preferences amongst shippers and receivers and models aggregate demand for a number
of markets10 using a random coefficients framework. The authors pair these estimates
of demand with a model of costs and the assumption that firms engage in Bertrand
competition to obtain estimates of efficiency and market power. Using this framework,
the authors examine the effect of mergers on efficiency and consumer surplus. The authors
find strong evidence of scale economies and conclude that efficiency gains from mergers
outweigh the costs of increased market power and non-competitive pricing; the authors
estimate that over the period from 1986 to 2001, consumer surplus increased by about
30%. Further, the authors estimate that the ratio of price over marginal cost ranged
from 1.378 for freight services to 1.85 for intermodal services. Finally, the authors find
that returns to density for railroads were approximately 1.08, indicating that firms
are operating near their minimum efficient density. However, as previously noted, the
methods used in Berry et al. (1995) require a clear definition of markets in which the
firms compete, which can be difficult in the railroad industry where firms not only provide
different types of outputs but also service many distinct geographic areas.
Several other studies have also looked towards estimating returns to scale for
railroads. Keeler (1974) estimates a cost function for railroads and finds that average
returns to scale were approximately 0.993 in the period from 1968 to 1970. Caves et al.
(1981b) estimates an extensive translog cost function for railroads and found that returns
to scale remained relatively constant and near one over the period from 1955 to 1974.11
More recently, Bereskin (2009) estimates a model of costs and technological variation to
10These markets were defined over three different types of rail services: Bulk, general freight, and
intermodal transportation.
11Specifically, the authors estimate that scale elasticities of 1.012 for 1955 and 1963 and an elasticity of
1.036 in 1974.
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explain economies of scope, density, and scale and finds that the average railroad operates
at minimum efficient scale. Overall, the literature finds overwhelming evidence that
railroads are no longer able to realize economies of scale and are operating at capacity.
While many studies have examined railroad scales, few have looked towards estimating the
markup of price over marginal cost.12
Finally, research in railroads and other network industries has attempted to draw a
clear distinction between returns to scale and returns to density. While returns to scale
measures the degree to which output is affected by an increase in the overall scale of a
firm’s operations including the size of its network, returns to density holds network size
constant and measures the effect of increased concentration of input use. Since returns to
scale considers an increase in all inputs and network size while returns to density considers
an increase to all inputs other than network size, these returns can be markedly different
depending on how much of an effect network size has on output. Caves et al. (1984)
separate returns to density from returns to scale by estimating a trans-log cost function
that directly controls for network size and apply their model to the airline industry. Since
airline costs increase considerably as network size increases, the authors estimate that
returns to density significantly exceeded returns to scale, with elasticities of 1.18 and 0.99,
respectively. The cost literature regarding railroads similarly finds that larger networks are
associated with higher average costs; Wilson (1994) estimates that the cost elasticity of
network size is 0.22, and thus finds a significant difference in returns to scale and returns
to density, with estimates of 0.99 and 1.34, respectively.13 As a result, it is important to
draw the distinction between these measures and clearly identify which is being used.
12Notable exceptions are Ivaldi and McCullough (2005), as previously mentioned, and Bitzan (2000),
which simulates polar Ramsey markups for different levels of shipper captivity.
13Wilson (1997) estimates the cost elasticity of network size is even higher at 0.74, leading to an even
greater gap between scale and density estimates.
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Theory
I begin with a production technology that has been used in a plethora of previous
studies and specifically assume that production follows a Hicks-neutral process. In this
specification, I characterize production with a mapping of inputs into an aggregate output.
I also, however, recognize that the mapping depends on a set of operating characteristics
that vary across outputs and networks. Hence, I condition on the variable ϕ to reflect
these differences.14 Overall, I let the output of firm i in year t depend on a productivity
factor Ait, input use {Xjit}j∈M , where M is the set of inputs, and network characteristics
ϕit = {ϕξit}ξ∈Ξ, where Ξ is the set of network characteristics:
Qit = AitFt({Xjit};ϕit).
Now, I wish to make minimal assumptions on the shape or exact form of Ft, so I log-
linearize the production technology around the representative firm in each year. Letting
variables with t subscripts denote values for the representative firm (e.g., Qt is aggregate
output for the representative firm in year t), firm i’s output can be approximated with
ln(Qit)− ln(Qt) ≈ (ln(Ait)− ln(At))
+
∑
j∈M
∂ lnFt
∂ lnXjit
Ä
ln(Xjit)− ln(Xjt )
ä
+
∑
ξ∈Ξ
∂ lnFt
∂ lnϕξit
Ä
ln(ϕξit)− ln(ϕξt )
ä
.
Now, for notational convenience, I will use lower case variables with a hat to indicate log-
deviations of that variable from the representative firm in a given year (e.g., q̂it = ln(Qit)−
14Empirically, of course, I have a set of variables for operating characteristics and networks as well as a
set of firm dummies that control for these effects.
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ln(Qt)). Then, this approximation can be rewritten as
q̂it ≈ âit +
∑
j∈M
∂ lnFt
∂ lnXjit
x̂jit +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
∂ lnFt
∂ lnϕξit
ϕ̂ξit.
Standard log-linearization evaluates the above derivatives at the point centered around
(i.e., around the representative firm at the point (At, Xt, ϕt)). However, the multivariate
version of the mean value theorem tells us that there exists a point (Ait, X it, ϕit) between
(Ait, Xit, ϕit) and (At, Xt, ϕt) such that this is no longer an approximation but is in fact
exact:
q̂it = âit +
∑
j∈M
x̂jit ·
∂ lnFt
∂ lnXjit
∣∣∣∣∣
(Ait,Xit,ϕit)
+
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ϕ̂ξit ·
∂ lnFt
∂ lnϕξit
∣∣∣∣∣
(Ait,Xit,ϕit)
.
Unfortunately, the mean value theorem only tells us about the existence of this point but
not its exact location. As discussed in the Model section, the best a priori approximation
is likely where the derivatives are evaluated at the midpoint between (Ait, Xit, ϕit) and
(At, Xt, ϕt), but I also investigate evaluating the derivatives at (At, Xt, ϕt) and find little
difference in results. I will continue to use the bar notation to indicate evaluation of these
derivatives at the interior point whose existence is guaranteed by the mean value theorem.
Next, notice that ∂ lnFt
∂ lnXjit
is the elasticity of output with respect to input j and
∂ lnFt
∂ lnϕξit
is the elasticity of output with respect to network characteristic ξ. For notational
convenience, denote these elasticities with αjit and ζ
ξ
it, where the bar notation indicates
evaluation of these elasticities at the point (Ait, X it, ϕit). One would like to have more
information about the exact form of these elasticities; I begin by noticing that the
elasticity of output with respect to input j can be expressed as
αjit =
Xjit
Qit
∂Qit
∂Xjit
.
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Now, if firms are price-takers in input markets, then the first-order condition for profit
maximization with respect to input j is
∂Qit
∂Xjit
=
W jit
Pit + (∂Pit/∂Qit)Qit
=
W jit
(1 + 1/εit)Pit
,
where W jit is the price of input j, Pit is the price of output, and εit is the elasticity of
demand for using firm i’s network in year t. Notice that, similar to Klette, I aam allowing
railroads to experience different input prices, reflecting the possibility that the quality of
inputs might vary across firms. Then, the elasticity of output with respect to input j can
be written as
αjit =
Xjit
Qit
∂Qit
∂Xjit
=
Ç
1
1 + 1/εit
å(
XjitW
j
it
QitPit
)
= µit
XjitW
j
it
QitPit
,
where µit is the ratio of price to marginal cost, which I will refer to as the markup. For
notational convenience, I denote the cost share of input j to total revenue with
sjit ··=
X
j
itW
j
it
QitP it
.
As a result, the elasticity of output with respect to input j can be expressed as αjit =
µits
j
it. As noted by Klette, due to various rigidities with fixed inputs, this relationship
likely doesn’t hold for capital inputs K; as a remedy, notice that scale to production is
given by
ηit =
∑
j∈M
αjit = α
K
it +
∑
j 6=K
αjit.
Solving this expression for αKit , one can arrive at the conclusion that
αKit = ηit −
∑
j 6=K
αjit = ηit − µit
∑
j 6=K
sjit.
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Returning to the equation for firm production and using the above work,
q̂it = âit + x̂
K
it α
K
it +
∑
j 6=K
x̂jitα
j
it +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ϕ̂ξitζ
ξ
it
= âit + ηitx̂
K
it + µit
∑
j 6=K
sjit(x̂
j
it − x̂Kit ) +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ζ
ξ
itϕ̂
ξ
it.
Finally, since input use, input prices, and output are observed, one can be able to
calculate
x̂Vit ··=
∑
j 6=K
sjit(x̂
j
it − x̂Kit ).
Thus, firm i’s output in year t can be described with
q̂it = âit + ηitx̂
K
it + µitx̂
V
it +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ζ
ξ
itϕ̂
ξ
it.
Data
The data used for this analysis primarily come from R1 forms, which contain various
financial information and operating statistics for each Class 1 Railroad and are published
annually by the United States Surface Transportation Board (STB). These forms contain
aggregate measures of output, input use and prices, measures of capital depreciation, and
statistics describing various network characteristics. I additionally supplement these data
with the annualized version of the Quarterly Freight Commodity Statistics (QCS), also
published by the STB. The QCS describes shipment revenue and tonnages for individual
commodity groups, which are useful for precise measurement of prices and describing
network characteristics. The time span of the sample has been restricted to the period
from 2001 to 2012 for two reasons. First, though my preferred model allows for changing
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parameters over time, it may not accurately capture massive structural changes15 to the
industry that could be present in longer samples; as noted in the Background section,
railroad operations have been relatively stable since 2001.16 Second, all mergers of Class
I railroads occurred prior to 1999,17 no entry or exit occurred after 1999, and firms
were fully consolidated by 2001, meaning that this sample constitutes a balanced panel,
providing less complication in estimation. The Class I Railroads in the sample are the
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway (BNSF), the Canadian National Railway
(CN), CSX Transportation (CSX), the Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS), the Norfolk
Southern Railway (NS), the Soo Line Railroad (SOO), and the Union Pacific Railroad
(UP).
The dependent variable in this analysis is aggregate revenue ton-miles, which is
defined as one ton of product shipped one mile that generates revenue. I explain variation
in output with input usage and variables describing characteristics of the network.
Friedlaender and Spady (1981) find that costs, and by extension production, depend on
way-and-structures capital, variable inputs, and technological conditions. The literature
has used many different way-and-structures and technology variables to describe costs,
but the authors generally find that total miles of road, average length of haul, traffic mix,
and total value of track and other capital are key to modeling costs related to fixed inputs.
Since I wish to measure scale elasticities relative to the value of capital used, I use value of
track as a fixed input and the remaining variables as indicators of technological conditions.
15For example, the industry continued to experience consolidation and significant technological change
through the late 1990s.
16While the industry was certainly more stable in the 2000s than in the period immediately following
partial deregulation, there were still significant changes ranging from shocks in demand to substantial
increases in investment over the course of the sample. Since these changes affected firms in different ways
at different times, I still expect to find heterogeneity in model estimates across both firms and years.
17It is worth noting that while the Canadian Pacific Railway has owned the Soo Line Railroad since
1990, Soo underwent a change of name to Canadian Pacific in the early 2000s; I will still refer to this firm
as the Soo Line Railroad.
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Also, similar to Friedlaender and Spady (1981), I treat labor, equipment, and fuel use as
variable inputs and I use rental rates as the opportunity cost of equipment inputs.
I define variable inputs for railroads to be labor, fuel, and the amounts of cars and
locomotives used. Labor use is measured in hours worked, with the price of labor defined
as the average wage for a railroad in a given year and fuel use is measured in gallons of
diesel; also, while the R1 forms provide the total numbers of cars and locomotives used, it
does not tell directly tell us about the opportunity cost of these inputs. Following Wilson
and Bitzan (2003), I define the annual per unit opportunity cost for an equipment input j
as
Annual Depreciationjit + ROI
j
it
Xjit
,
where ROIjit =
Ä
Investmentjit − Accumulated Depreciationjit
ä×CostKit and CostKit is the cost
of capital for firm i in year t. Investment, depreciation, and input use can all be found in
the R1 forms, and for the cost of capital I use the Rail Cost Adjustment Factor (RCAF)
from the Association of American Railroads. I use total investment in road as the fixed
input in this analysis. Since this variable measures the value of track, estimates of scale
elasticities can best be interpreted as the elasticity of output with respect to the value of
way-and-structures capital, holding network characteristics constant.18 As with equipment
variables, I calculate the opportunity cost of road investment using formulas similar to
those used above.
Finally, I include into my analysis several variables describing network
characteristics. First, as noted in Wilson and Bitzan (2003) and Ivaldi and McCullough
(2005), the type of shipment (i.e., way-, through-, or unit-train shipments) and the type
of product being shipped (e.g., bulk or specialty) could each have a large impact on costs
18As noted in the following paragraph, network size is included as a network characteristic, so this scale
parameter is the elasticity of output given an increase in way-and-structures investment, holding network
size constant. Thus, this elasticity of scale can better interpreted as elasticity of network density.
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and are therefore important in production decisions. To control for these factors, I include
the percentage of total ton-miles that are shipped via unit train and the percentage of ton
miles that ship bulk items19 into my regressions. Further, to capture the effective size of
the network, I also include the average length of haul and total miles of road as controls in
my regressions.
Descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in this regression are given in
Table 1; nominal variables have been adjusted for inflation, and each of these statistics has
been averaged across the time span of the sample.
Many of these variables including output, labor use, fuel use, numbers of
locomotives, and investment in road have remained relatively constant over the course
of the sample, except for a common negative shock induced by the 2009 recession.
The number of cars used by railroads has been steadily decreasing over time due to an
increasing number of shippers owning their own cars in recent years. Real prices of inputs
and output have been increasing since 1999 except during the recession. Measures of
network characteristics have remained largely constant over for each firm over this time
frame, illustrating the stability of the industry since consolidation occurred.
Empirical Models
Common Markups and Scales
Recall the expression for firm i’s output in year t:
q̂it = âit + ηitx̂
K
it + µitx̂
V
it +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ζ
ξ
itϕ̂
ξ
it.
19Bulk items belong to one of the following commodity groups: Metallic ores, nonmetallic minerals (not
fuels), waste/scrap metals, clay/concrete/glass/stone, farm products.
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I begin by assuming that a firm’s productivity relative to the median firm is constant
across time in expectation, so that âit = âi + uit, where uit is a mean zero error term.
Then, this expression for output can be rewritten as
q̂it = âi + ηitx̂
K
it + µitx̂
V
it +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ζ
ξ
itϕ̂
ξ
it + uit
= âi + ηx̂
K
it + µx̂
V
it +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ζ
ξ
ϕ̂ξit + vit,
where vit = uit+(ηit−η)x̂Kit +(µit−µ)x̂Vit +
∑
ξ(ζ
ξ
it− ζξ)ϕ̂ξit. Now, I assume that µ and η are
the mean markup and scale for the industry, so vit is also a mean zero error term. Since
q̂it, x̂
K
it , x̂
V
it , and ϕ̂it are all calculable from the data, if vit is assumed to be uncorrelated
with explanatory variables, this equation could potentially be estimated with OLS.
However, if shocks to output could be correlated with changes in input allocation, then my
estimates would suffer from endogeneity bias.20 Similar to Klette (1999), I propose using
an instrumental variables approach to obtain consistent parameter estimates. Fortunately,
I also have a set of relevant instruments that were assumed to be exogenous. In the
Theory section, I assumed firms take input prices as given, meaning that shocks to output
cannot be correlated with changes in input prices. I therefore instrument for x̂Kit and x̂
V
it
with input prices. I also assume network characteristics are exogenous to firm output21
and thus do not instrument for those variables.
20In fact, one would expect this to occur since firms will likely adjust input usage to most efficiently
produce a different quantity.
21Given that network characteristics are often difficult, if not impossible, for railroads to control
(e.g., firms might have some control over what proportion of its shipments carry bulk products, but that
characteristic is largely driven by demand for bulk product shipments), and since network characteristics
have remained relatively constant over the sample period, I find this to be a reasonable assumption.
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Firm- and Year-Specific Markups and Scales
Returning again to the equation
q̂it = âi + ηitx̂
K
it + µitx̂
V
it +
∑
ξ∈Ξ
ζ
ξ
ϕ̂ξit + uit.
Given the firm- and year-specific markups and scales that appear in this equation, it is not
identified in its current form; however, if it is assumed that these parameters come from
a common distribution, then this equation can become estimable. A common approach
for random-coefficient methods is to assume these parameters are independent and
identically distributed. However, due to the nature of competition between firms and how
technologies are adopted, I expect that markups and scale elasticities should be correlated,
so that the independence assumption fails to hold. Instead, I assume that markups and
scales have a common central tendency across firms, but allow these parameters to be
correlated in a flexible way. Additionally, since markups and scales have likely changed
over time for the industry as a whole, I allow for a flexible trend in the central tendency of
the distribution over time. Overall, letting the number of firms be denoted by F , I assume
that for each year t,
[µ1t − 1, ..., µFt − 1, η1t, ..., ηFt]′ ∼ lnN ([µt, ..., µt, ηt, ..., ηt]′,Σ2F ) ,
where the central tendency [µt, ηt]
′ is assumed to independently and identically distributed
across time and is also allowed to vary for each year. The distributional assumption on
each µit and ηit enforces the theoretical restriction that scale elasticities must be greater
than zero and markups must be greater than one for firms to be profit maximizing. Also,
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Σ2F is a square covariance matrix with dimensions equal to twice the number of firms that
allows for flexible correlation between firm markups and scales.
Results
Common Markups and Scales
I first estimate the model where markups and scales are assumed to be constant
across firms and years. Once again, in order to protect against endogeneity bias of the
parameters µ and η, I instrument the variables x̂V and x̂K with input prices. The first
stage of this regression is given in Table 2.
From these results, the instruments used appear to be relevant; in fact, given the
importance of the instruments in the first stage, one might be concerned about their
excludability. Fortunately, since there are more instruments than endogenous variables, I
can test this identifying assumption with an overidentification test. It is important to note
that if I find that these instruments are endogenous to output, then firms are not price
takers in input markets; since this assumption was used in the derivation of the theoretical
model, it is necessary that I don’t observe contrary effects in the data. The results of the
Sargan-Hansen overidentification test are given in Table 3, along with the second stage
results.
First, the p-value of the Sargan test is greater than 0.05, indicating that there isn’t
significant evidence of instrument endogeneity. Next, I estimate that the average industry
markup is 1.366 and that the average industry scale is 0.718. This indicates that, over
the course of the sample, firms charge prices that are 36.6% greater than marginal cost on
average and that firms are operating beyond minimum efficient scale. I additionally find
that the elasticity of output with respect to average length of haul is negative and that the
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TABLE 2. First Stage Results
Dependent variable:
x̂V x̂K
(1) (2)
Fuel price 0.044∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.017)
Labor price 0.009∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Road cost 1.811∗∗∗ −3.354∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.644)
Car cost −0.00003∗ 0.00004∗
(0.00001) (0.00002)
Locomotive cost −0.00000∗∗ 0.00000∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Average length of haul 0.003∗ −0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
Percent unit −0.045 0.178∗∗
(0.051) (0.087)
Percent bulk −0.006 −0.129∗
(0.041) (0.069)
Network size −0.244∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.076)
Observations 84 84
R2 0.853 0.996
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.995
Residual Std. Error (df = 68) 0.049 0.083
F Statistic (df = 15; 68) 26.343∗∗∗ 1,059.620∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
elasticities with respect to other network characteristics are not differentiable from zero at
the 5% level.
Firm- and Year-Specific Markups and Scales
In this section I present results from the model that allows markups and scales
to vary across firms and across time. This model also allows for correlations between
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TABLE 3. Common Parameter Regression
q̂
x̂V 1.366∗
(0.814)
x̂K 0.718
(0.479)
Average length of haul -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
Percent unit 0.122∗
(0.072)
Percent bulk 0.065
(0.089)
Network size 0.134
(0.34)
Sargan Test Statistic 8.735
Sargan Test p-value 0.068
Railroad FE Yes
Observations 98
R2 0.998
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
markups and scales across firms, which can shed light on market structure. Rather
than assuming parameters are given and data are random, as in a classical framework,
Bayesian methods assume the data are given and parameters are random. As a result,
these methods will yield probability distributions for each parameter that depend on prior
beliefs and the likelihood of the data.
To conduct this estimation, I used a Metropolis-Hastings sampler with 500,000 burn-
in iterations and 1,000,000 sampling iterations. Moderate autocorrelation of the Monte
Carlo chain makes it necessary to use many samples and independent chains to obtain a
representative sample of the posterior distribution. To ensure each chain has converged, I
have varied initial parameter values and produced trace plots for each chain, ensuring that
draws from the chain appear stationary. Additionally, I have varied prior distributions and
compared results to the specification used in this paper to ensure prior assumptions aren’t
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driving results. The full model and prior assumptions are presented in the Appendix of
this paper.
This model produces a posterior probability distribution for markups and scales
for each firm and in each year; since this constitutes a mass of information, I begin by
examining these parameters for the most recent year for which results are available.
Table 4 contains distribution quantiles for each firm’s markup and scale in 2012 as well
as elasticities with respect to network characteristics. I also present density plots for each
firm’s markup and scale in Figure 2.
TABLE 4. Bayesian Estimation Results
Quantiles:
Mean 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
2014 Markups
BNSF 1.608 1.219 1.391 1.548 1.748 2.203
CN 1.406 1.238 1.296 1.358 1.466 1.745
CSX 1.558 1.237 1.354 1.49 1.648 2.183
KCS 1.508 1.174 1.304 1.478 1.664 1.998
NS 1.422 1.168 1.257 1.344 1.545 1.896
SOO 1.51 1.185 1.295 1.483 1.657 2.035
UP 1.518 1.245 1.346 1.46 1.572 2.072
2014 Scales
BNSF 1.445 1.265 1.403 1.459 1.504 1.571
CN 0.968 0.865 0.927 0.978 1.012 1.047
CSX 1.136 0.509 0.781 1.034 1.483 1.965
KCS 0.911 0.883 0.902 0.912 0.921 0.939
NS 0.827 0.609 0.701 0.823 0.93 1.089
SOO 0.845 0.766 0.792 0.828 0.895 0.942
UP 1.025 0.888 0.964 1.047 1.087 1.13
Average length of haul 0 -0.008 -0.003 0 0.002 0.006
Percent unit -0.221 -0.419 -0.275 -0.228 -0.142 -0.041
Percent bulk 0.134 0.023 0.091 0.121 0.181 0.263
Network size -0.261 -0.394 -0.323 -0.263 -0.19 -0.159
One can first notice that there is significant heterogeneity in markup estimates
across firms. There also appears to be some connection of markups with firm size and,
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FIGURE 4. Distributions of Markups and Scales in 2012
by extension, market power; for example, BNSF, the largest firm in 2012, has the highest
markup estimate while CN, a much smaller firm, has a lower markup. The posterior
markup densities show that firms are generally pricing in excess and sometimes well in
excess of marginal cost, with median markup estimates between 34.4% and 54.8%.22 I
find even greater heterogeneity in scales among firms. Smaller railroads like CN, KCS,
NS, and SOO appear to be producing beyond their minimum efficient scale, while larger
firms like BNSF, CSX, and UP show evidence of economies of scale. I estimate that BNSF
is operating the furthest below minimum efficient scale in 2012, with mean and median
scale estimates of 1.445 and 1.459, respectively. The heterogeneity observed in these
22It is important to note that markups in excess of one aren’t necessarily indicative of non-competitive
pricing. In particular, firms might charge prices greater than marginal costs in order to remain viable.
Unfortunately, because this model is accurate only local to the median firm, I cannot estimate total costs
and therefore cannot address firm viability.
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parameter densities makes it clear that the assumption of common markups and scales
is not appropriate, even for a given year.
This model allows for variation in markups and scales both across firms and
across time. To show these dynamic results, I present line plots of median markup and
scale estimates for each firm across time in Figure 3. While firm markups in 2012 are
approximately the same as in 2001, there are many industry wide and firm specific
fluctuations that have occurred over the sample. Overall, however, I don’t observe a
significant trend in average markups. Similarly, with the exception of BNSF and CSX,
scale elasticities have remained relatively constant over the sample and tend to be centered
around one, indicating that firms are producing at approximately minimum efficient scale
on average. BNSF has shown a persistent increase in returns to scale that began in 2007,
while CSX temporarily produced well below minimum efficient scale from 2009 to 2011;
both of these increases in returns to scale appear to be driven by greater investment in
these railroads’ networks that led to excess capacity.23 CSX began to fill that capacity in
2012, but BNSF has maintained investment and, thus, its economies of scale.
The United States Surface Transportation Board currently investigates shipments
for which the ratio of price to estimated average variable cost is greater than 1.8; these
shipments are scrutinized by the regulatory agency and the firm faces consequences if
sufficient supplementary evidence is found. The Bayesian estimation framework used
in this analysis allows me to estimate the probability that markups lie in some interval;
thus, these results can be used to obtain the probability that a firm’s markup of the price
for network services in a given year is greater than the STB’s designated threshold. I
23For example, over the period from 2004 to 2008, BNSF’s investment in its network increased by 7.1%
per year on average while the rest of the industry increased investment by only 5.2%. These investments
improved the efficiency of inputs used on BNSF’s network; in the period from 2006 to 2009, BNSF’s
output grew by 10%, yet it used 18.8% less fuel and 19% less labor.
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FIGURE 5. Markups and Scales Over Time
present these probabilities for each firm in each year in Figure 4.24 While this plot is
similar to the plot of markups, it does not exactly match because of finer intricacies in
the distribution of each parameter not fully described by the median. I observe strong
evidence of excessive markups in the results, with this probability exceeding 0.5 for at
least one year for each firm in the sample. Additionally, 2004 and 2007 appear to have the
highest overall propensity for excessive markups.
As mentioned previously, this model allows markups and scales to be correlated
across firms in each year, which can give information about market structure. I expect
that markups and scales might be correlated across firms because of non-competitive
pricing behavior, overlapping networks, and shared technologies. If two firms have a
positive correlation in markups for a given year, then if one firm realizes a markup above
24It is important to note that these probabilities are not unconditionally independent from one another
and only reflect the probability that a given firm’s markup exceeds 1.8 in a given year.
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its mean for that year, the other firm will tend to as well. While I can’t attribute a cause
to this correlation, it does provide information about the interaction between firms. These
markup and scale correlations have been calculated for the most recent year available and
are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
TABLE 5. Markup Correlations in 2012
BNSF CN CSX KCS NS SOO UP
BNSF 1.0000
CN 0.30235 1.0000
CSX 0.20687 0.37846 1.0000
KCS 0.31561 0.35442 0.34472 1.0000
NS 0.17591 0.22838 0.24227 0.56877 1.0000
SOO 0.0731 0.13855 0.21197 0.37733 0.35825 1.0000
UP 0.35227 0.31953 0.40456 0.39826 0.49082 0.26694 1.0000
First, one will notice that each of the correlations between markups is estimated to
be positive, indicating that a positive shock to any one firm’s markup will tend to increase
every other firm’s markup. This observed correlation could be due to competition between
firms, because as one firm lowers its price others will do the same to remain competitive
and maintain customers, but could also be attributed to various other external causes
that affect all firms in a similar way. For example, a positive shock to fuel prices will
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TABLE 6. Scale Correlations in 2012
BNSF CN CSX KCS NS SOO UP
BNSF 1.0000
CN 0.33768 1.0000
CSX 0.16234 0.19833 1.0000
KCS -0.06246 -0.35413 0.06353 1.0000
NS -0.41378 0.21033 0.20415 -0.29922 1.0000
SOO -0.48628 -0.47378 -0.52418 0.29651 -0.29331 1.0000
UP 0.76765 0.33826 0.17917 -0.13196 -0.22497 -0.69003 1.0000
tend to increase marginal costs for each firm, thereby lowering markups. Given that I
don’t directly control for the effect of fuel prices on markups, this shock would induce an
observed correlation among markups.
I observe even greater heterogeneity in scale correlations among firms. Again, I
are not able to attribute a cause to these correlations, but they do offer some insight on
market structure. There could be positive correlations in returns to scale if, for example,
the adoption of a new technology affects the productivity of inputs in a similar way
for each firm, or if natural disasters or economic conditions affect railroad networks
comparably. A negative correlation in scale elasticities could be the result of some
firms consistently realizing the benefits of new technology before others or if shocks
to production allow some firms to attract more efficient inputs than others. Overall,
since these estimates of correlation are generally large and vary in magnitude, allowing
correlation among these parameters is important to properly describe markups and scales.
Robustness Checks
Table 7 presents estimates of markups, scale elasticities, and elasticities of network
characteristics for four separate specifications. The OLS and 2SLS specifications both
assume that markups and scales are constant across both firms and time, while the
Linear and Flexible Trend specifications allow these parameters to vary by both firm and
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year. The median of the average markup and scale for 2012 are presented in the Linear
and Flexible Trend results. The 2SLS model is the primary common-parameter model
presented in Section 7.1 and the OLS specification simply runs only the second stage
and ignores instrumentation. The Flexible Trend model is my primary model that was
presented in Section 7.2, and the Linear Trend model is similar but allows the central
tendency of markups and scales to drift linearly through time. Further explanation of
the Linear Trend model and complete results can be found in the Appendix. Estimates are
generally similar across specifications but differ in some important ways. First, the OLS
estimates of markups and scales are lower than the 2SLS estimates, indicating the need
for an instrumental variables approach to correct for endogeneity. Second, including firm
heterogeneity in markups and scale elasticities yields higher average markups and scales,
presumably because of skew in the distribution of markups and scales across firms and
because these results only describe average markups in 2012, which showed evidence of
higher than average markups in previous years. Finally, the Linear Trend model produces
higher estimates of markups and scales than the Flexible Trend model because it attempts
to apply a trend to these parameters when no clear trend may exist, forcing more recent
estimates to be higher. Overall, because of its flexibility and theoretical basis, I prefer the
Flexible Trend specification presented earlier in the paper.
TABLE 7. Comparison of Results
OLS 2SLS Linear Flexible
(all years) (2012 only)
µ 1.278 1.366 1.557 1.49
η 0.627 0.718 0.904 1.018
Average length of haul -0.007 -0.007 0.001 0
Percent unit 0.129 0.122 -0.165 -0.228
Percent bulk 0.049 0.065 0.096 0.121
Network size 0.208 0.134 0.063 -0.263
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Conclusion
The railroad industry has undergone massive changes since its partial deregulation.
With the introduction and improvement of competing forms of transportation, regulatory
change was needed to keep firms viable and led to massive consolidation of firms,
abandonment of routes, and increased flexibility over pricing. While these changes lowered
costs and improved the outlook of the industry, there have been many concerns that
railroads are charging excessive rates, especially to captive shippers.
The methods used by railroad regulators to identify evidence of non-competitive
pricing among firms have been heavily scrutinized in recent years. Due both to the lack
of theoretical foundation and practical application of these methods, there has been a
growing need for robust techniques to investigate pricing behavior and market structure.
Many successful studies have been conducted that bring sound theoretical models derived
from economic principles together with robust econometric techniques to investigate
various phenomena in rail markets, but to my knowledge no published work has been able
to successfully obtain consistent estimates of markups and scale elasticities.
This research estimates a model of production to obtain estimates of markups and
scales for each firm and in each year. I first find that these parameters show significant
heterogeneity across firms and time, indicating the need to model this variation. Next, I
find that most firms charge prices well in excess of marginal costs; while recent markups
are lower than for the majority of the 2000s, I still find markup estimates between 34%
and 55% in 2012. Finally, I find that some firms have made efforts to increase capacity,
but most firms have filled excess capacity and are operating near minimum efficient scale.
While these results provide broad insight into the productive capabilities of firms, it would
is useful to know specifics of how those capabilities change and factors that drive that
change. In order to further investigate the production capabilities of railroads and how
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those abilities have evolved over time, I turn to my third chapter, “Decomposing Changes
in Productivity Using Bayesian Methods.”
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CHAPTER III
DECOMPOSING CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY USING BAYESIAN METHODS
Abstract
Productivity and its growth are central to the long-term growth, and long-term viability
of firms and industries. Partial deregulation of railroads was led by concerns that
existing regulation and changes to the industry led to stagnation in productivity. Policy
changes made it easier for firms to increase productivity through broad organizational
changes like mergers and abandoning unprofitable routes as well as specific technological
innovation through the 1980s and early 1990s. However, as the industry has become
increasingly consolidated and as more lines have been abandoned, firms may need to rely
on technological change to increase productivity. I develop and estimate a model that
separates changes in productivity due to innovation and those caused by non-innovative
factors and use Bayesian estimation. This allows productivity and technology to evolve
flexibly across firms and through time, allowing an examination of changes in railroad
productivity and identification of its driving component. I find that every Class I railroad
has experienced growth in productivity since 1999. Improvements in technology were the
driving factor in the growth of BNSF, KCS, Soo Line, and UP, while CN, CSX, and NS
saw significant growth due to broad organizational changes. Finally, I develop a metric
that determines whether firms substitute inputs towards factors that innovation makes
more productive. I estimate the probability that each firm takes that action to be around
50% with no discernible pattern over time, providing evidence that firms don’t anticipate
technological change or don’t adjust input allocation to take advantage of innovations.
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Introduction
The productivity of firms is the amount of real output that can be produced with
a marginal increase in real inputs. It has long been of interest to researchers, regulators,
and industry analysts alike. Productivity allows firms to produce their products at lower
cost and is also the source of long-term economic growth. Further, the level and growth
of productivity informs regulators and is central in their regulatory mandate. Prior to
its partial deregulation, the railroad industry was faced with many concerns of viability
and low levels of productivity. While productivity growth was rapid through the mid-
1900s, it had slowed dramatically by the mid-1970s due to the rise of competing modes
of transportation and changes to the types of products being shipped. With the goal of
reducing costs and increasing productivity, the industry was partially deregulated in 1980.
The immediate effects of this policy have been studied extensively,1 and it is clear that
there has been rapid productivity growth since partial deregulation (Wilson, 1994).
The more recent effects of partial deregulation have not been examined. Immediately
following partial deregulation, it was relatively easy for firms to merge (thereby taking
advantage of economies of scale) and ceasing service on unprofitable routes (Bitzan and
Wilson, 2007). The number of Class I railroads fell from 40 in 1980 to just 7 in 1999, and
the total size of the network controlled by these carriers dropped from 164,822 miles in
1980 to 95,391 miles in 2013 (United States Surface Transportation Board, 2015). While
these changes have dramatically reduced costs in the industry and improved its viability,
there is relatively little room for to continue realizing productivity growth through these
broad changes (Bitzan and Keeler, 2007). Instead, firms may need to improve their
production technologies through innovation and substitute towards more productive
1For further reading, see Bitzan and Keeler (2007), Winston et al. (1990), and Barnekov and Kleit
(1990).
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inputs in order to realize continued growth, which is vital to the sustained viability of the
industry.
In order to separately identify changes in productivity, I develop a model that
incorporates inefficiency and also allows productivity and technology to vary across
firms and evolve in a flexible way over time. Using a theoretical framework, I decompose
changes in production into increased use of inputs, input substitution, increased
productivity due to technological change, and increased productivity due to non-innovative
factors. I then estimate my model using Bayesian methods. This allows me to identify
and decompose productivity changes for each firm and each year. I am not aware of any
published research that empirically separates growth in productivity due to innovation
and that due to factors other than innovation. Productivity growth due to technological
change becomes increasingly important as an industry matures and other methods of
increasing productivity like merging with or acquiring other firms become less feasible.
Further, firms can take potentially take greater advantage of innovations by substituting
towards inputs that changing technology makes more productive. I identify a condition
under which firms substitute towards more productive inputs and estimate the probability
that firms take that action for each year. Finally, these models provide estimates of total
factor productivity and its growth, which are key values for informing regulation and give
insight into developments in the industry.
The models I estimate allow productivity growth to vary flexibly both across firms
and over time by imparting structure on its dynamics; specifically, I allow productivity
and technological parameters to follow random-walks with drift. Ignoring the effect of
technological change, I find that the Canadian National (CN) railway showed the strongest
productivity growth since 1999 at a rate of 3.551% per year. All other railroads exhibited
modest productivity growth, between 0.235% and 2.474% per year. After accounting for
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technological innovation, I am able to identify how much of productivity growth is due to
changing technology and how much is due to neutral shifts in the production technology.
I find that CN, CSX, and Norfolk Southern (NS) railways experienced strong growth in
productivity caused by factors other than technological growth; all other railroads showed
decreasing productivity due to these non-innovative factors. Burlington Northern Santa Fe
(BNSF), Kansas City Southern (KCS), Soo Line, and Union Pacific (UP) found significant
increases in productivity due to technological change, with growth between 30% and 60%
between 1999 and 2014. CN, CSX, and NS experienced smaller productivity gains due
to changing technology. Overall, when considering total productivity due to all factors,
CN and KCS have shown the strongest growth in productivity driven mostly by factors
other than technological innovation, though both have seen decreases since 2011. BNSF
showed modest total productivity growth due to technological change, and all other firms
had constant total productivity. Finally, I find that firms have about a 50% chance of
shifting resources towards inputs that innovation makes more productive. This provides
evidence that firms don’t anticipate technological changes, aren’t able to substitute inputs
fast enough to capitalize on innovations, or that input prices tend to offset changes in
technology.
I estimate three different models with varying degrees of flexibility in the dynamics
of productivity change and technological growth. The first model assumes the productivity
of each firm follows a simple linear trend, the second allows productivity to follow a
random-walk with drift while holding technology constant, and the third allows both
productivity and technology to follow a random-walk with drift. Using Bayesian model
selection, I find that the model allowing both productivity and technology to evolve
flexibly over time has the greatest probability of being the true model, indicating the
importance of controlling for technological change. Using estimated model probabilities,
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I conduct Bayesian model averaging of the results of each model and find that each firm
likely experienced modest growth in productivity between 1999 and 2014, with median
estimates ranging from 0.296% to 0.719% per annum. However, I estimate the probability
that all firms experienced productivity growth is 46.783%, indicating that at least one firm
likely saw a decrease in productivity over the sample period.
This paper begins with an overview of the railroad industry and its regulation.
Following this, I provide a review of the relevant literature, covering both the methods
used to measure productivity and how productivity has been studied in the railroad
industry. I then develop my theoretical model and proceed to present the data used in
this analysis. I cover each of the three empirical models presented in this paper, then show
and explain my results. A conclusion of my findings follows.
Institutional Background
The railroad industry has been federally regulated since 1887. The Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was created in response to concerns of excessive rates,
market power, and discriminatory pricing in the industry with the passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) of 1887. This policy gave the ICC control over collective
rate making and oversight over mergers and provided a channel through which the
reasonability of rates charged by railroads could easily been questioned by shippers.
Through most of the 1900s, these regulations helped promote competition in the industry
and kept shipping rates low while still allowing railroads to be profitable.
By the 1970s, the regulations that once promoted competition impeded firms in
the industry. Not only had new competing modes of transportation such as air, barge,
and trucking been developed and improved, but plastics, which are much less dense
than goods shipped in the past, constituted a greater proportion of all goods shipped.
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Consequentially, railroad costs rose to the point that rate regulation prevented firms from
being cost viable. In an effort to save the industry, railroads were partially deregulated
with the passage of the 4R Act in 1976 and the Staggers Act in 1980. These policies
allowed railroads to merge more easily to reduce costs through economies of scale, gave
firms the ability to negotiate contracts and generally provided greater pricing flexibility,
and allowed firms to more easily abandon lines on which operations were not profitable.2
Partial deregulation resulted in many drastic changes to the industry. The number
of Class I railroads fell from 40 in 1980 to just 7 in 1999, mostly through acquisitions and
mergers. The total size of the network controlled by Class I railroads fell from 164,822
miles in 1980 to 95,391 miles in 2013, largely through the abandonment and sale of
unprofitable lines. The average length of haul increased from 615 miles in 1980 to 973
miles in 2013 (United States Surface Transportation Board, 2015). Overall, individual
railroad networks were larger, the total size of the network grew smaller, and shipments
were traveling longer distances. As a result of these changes, rail shipping rates fell
dramatically, from $0.0646 per revenue-ton-mile in 1980 to $0.0329 in 2014 (United States
Surface Transportation Board, 2015). The reduction in prices is largely reflective of a
reduction in railroad costs and improvements in productivity (Bitzan and Keeler, 2007).
Following rapid changes that occurred in the railroad industry through the 1980s and
early 1990s, the general structure of the industry has mostly remained constant since 1999.
Only seven Class I railroads remained in 1999, and additional mergers have not occurred.
Most of the lines on which operations were unprofitable have been abandoned or sold to
short-line regional railways (Tretheway et al., 1997). As a result, there is little room for
railroads to improve their productivity on those fronts. Thus, to remain viable, firms have
2There have been a considerable number of studies that describe these policies and their effects. See,
for example, Bitzan and Wilson (2007), Schmalensee et al. (2015), Wilson (1997), and Winston et al.
(1990).
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turned towards other channels, such as technological progress, to realize productivity gains
and further reduce costs. As an example, the elimination of cabooses, a remnant of the age
of steam locomotives that required a crew to operate, resulted in a reduction in costs by
between 5% and 8% between 1983 and 1997 (Bitzan and Keeler, 2003). Railroads have
also invested $575 billion in infrastructure and equipment since 1980; recently, nearly
2700 new locomotives were purchased between 2008 and 2012, and many innovations
have been made in safety, fault detection, and performing maintenance that preempts
equipment failure (AAR, 2013). To my knowledge, there has been no published research
that considers the effects of these recent innovations.
Literature Review
This research investigates productivity of the railroad industry using a stochastic
frontier model. In this section, I provide a history and review of studies and methods
used to estimate productivity in general. I then describe research that has investigated
the productivity of railroads and the effects of the industry’s partial deregulation. Finally,
I describe stochastic frontier models and how they have been used to study productivity
and separate it from inefficiency.
Total Factor Productivity
Productivity has rightfully long been a focal point in many branches of economics;
various aspects of productivity can inform on the effectiveness with which inputs can
be transformed into outputs as well as the overall efficiency of production. Total factor
productivity has been studied extensively and provides a useful metric: The number units
of real output a firm can produce with one unit of real inputs (Jorgenson and Griliches,
1967). The value of this measure can be easily seen; it can be used to evaluate economies
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of scale, trends provide information about growth rates, and heterogeneity across firms can
shed light on factors that affect productivity and costs.
The notion of total factor productivity was created to explain economic growth.
Growth can either be the result of increased use of inputs, usually called capital
accumulation,3 or growth in productivity. In light of limited resources, increases in
productivity are the only way to sustainably promote economic growth.4 Empirical
findings have shown that productivity is the main cause of changes in economic growth;
in his seminal paper, Solow (1957) found that between 1909 and 1949, approximately
one-eighth of the variation in output was due to capital accumulation and seven-eighths
was due to changes in productivity. Further, he estimated that annual productivity
growth rates ranged from -7.6% to 7.2%, at an average of 1.5% per annum. Finally, Solow
estimates several forms for the production function. Using a log-linear (i.e., Cobb-Douglas)
form, he estimates that the level of productivity was approximately 0.482.
Productivity has been estimated using a variety of methods. Solow’s seminal work
on productivity suffered from a number of practical issues. Most notably, any deviations
from the empirical model (i.e., residuals) were assumed to be the result of differences
in productivity (Solow, 1957). Of course, there are many additional sources of error
including differences in efficiency and measurement error. Further, Solow used a linear
approximation in his analysis, which does not allow inputs to exhibit complementarity or
substitutability and can result in large approximation errors. Several models have been
3While non-capital inputs (e.g., labor) can also increase output, economists have historically not
attributed long-term growth to those factors since the stock of those inputs tends to grow at a relatively
slow rate.
4If resources are limited, capital cannot be endlessly accumulated, so growth must come from another
source.
55
developed and extended to address these issues and largely fit into two groups, either
parametric or non-parametric.5
Parametric models assume a specific form for the production function and aim to
decompose shifts in the production frontier into changes in productivity and efficiency
and measurement error. There has been an abundance of research that estimate translog
cost functions and infer changes in productivity from shifts in the cost function. Since
translog cost functions are a second-order approximation of the true cost function, this
method reduces the approximation error presents in Solow’s work. Caves et al. (1981b)
used this framework to derive an expression for productivity growth that depends on the
change in costs and change in output over time. The authors estimate these parameters in
a cost function and use them to calculate productivity growth in the U.S. passenger and
freight rail industry. Cost function frameworks similar to this have been used to study
productivity in a variety of contexts.6 While this framework is very flexible, it cannot
separately identify productivity from inefficiency. Stochastic frontier (SF) models, which
are further explained in Section 3.3, extend the standard translog estimation framework
to include inefficiency; by noting that efficiency must lie between 0% and 100%, structure
can be imparted on the model that allows productivity and efficiency to be separately
identified (Aigner et al., 1977).
Non-parametric methods remain agnostic of the specific functional form of the
production function and instead rely on non-parametric methods to infer its shape. Data
envelopment analysis (DEA) is most commonly used to infer the production frontier. This
method assumes that production plans lie on the frontier and uses linear programming
5Of course, semi-parametric models, which have some parametric and some non-parametric
components, have also been used. For further reading, see Jondrow et al. (1982) and Park and Simar
(1994).
6For more examples of studies of the railroad industry that use translog cost functions, see Bitzan and
Wilson (2007), and Bitzan and Keeler (2007).
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techniques to trace out the exact location of the frontier (Friesner et al., 2006).7 Lim
and Lovell (2009) use DEA to investigate short-run profit changes in the rail industry. By
using non-parametric methods to identify the production frontier, the authors decompose
changes in profit into changes in price and productivity.
Both parametric methods like SF and non-parametric methods like DEA commonly
appear in the literature. Eisenbeis et al. (1999) compares the two in the context of the
banking industry and finds that while the level of estimated inefficiency is higher under
DEA, the two measures are highly correlated, indicating they capture similar information.
However, the authors also find that estimates from SF analysis more accurately capture
efficiency in management and preferences for risk than do linear programming methods.
Stochastic Frontier Models
Stochastic frontier (SF) models extend the productivity estimation framework in two
important ways. First, they assume that firms are not necessarily efficient; these analyses
distinguish maximum possible output from actual output and term the deviation between
the two inefficiency. The seminal work of Aigner et al. (1977) presents a commonly used
formulation of the stochastic frontier framework:
qi = f(xi; β) + εi − δi. (3.1)
In equation (3.1), qi represents log output, xi are inputs, β are parameters describing
production, εi is a productivity, and δi is inefficiency. Under usual error assumptions,
it would be impossible to separately identify εi from δi; however, inefficiency, defined
7More specifically, the basic DEA model assumes non-dominated plans, for which no other plan
produces more output with fewer inputs, lie on the frontier. Extensions of this model have been made
to include inefficiency.
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as deviation from maximum output, is inherently one-sided. Using this assumption and
modeling δi as, for example, half-normal or log-normal allows productivity shocks and
inefficiency to be separately identified.
Similar to other parametric methods of estimating production, the problem of
estimating the form of the production function remains. Unlike non-parametric methods
like DEA, parametric models require a the researcher to assume a specific form of the
production function; in order to maintain minimal assumptions on the exact shape of
the production function, researchers have historically utilized some form of functional
approximation to address this problem. Early research into productivity, such as Solow
(1957), used a first-order Taylor approximation on the log-production function, also known
as the Cobb-Douglas form. While this form provides a good starting approximation, it
does imply the assumption that production is additive in the inputs; that is, the Cobb-
Douglas form assumes that the productivity of any given input depends only on the
amount of that input being used and not on any other inputs. Christensen et al. (1973)
test simple functional forms that assume additivity and constant returns to scale against
a more flexible second-order Taylor approximation of the log-production function, also
known as the translog form. The authors use data describing private production in the
United States from 1929 to 1969 and find that the assumption of additivity is clearly not
satisfied, leading to bias when a first-order approximation is used. As a result, it is safer to
use a more flexible functional form such as translog or even higher-order approximations if
the assumption of additivity is not clearly satisfied.
Stochastic frontier models have been extended in a number of ways and have been
used to identify differences or changes in productivity and efficiency. Schmidt and Lovell
(1979) separately estimate the production frontier and the cost function to separate
technical inefficiency, which originates in the transformation of inputs into outputs, from
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allocative inefficiency, which occurs when inputs are not used in the optimal proportions.
Applying this model to steam-electricity generation, there was evidence that both types
of inefficiency were significant: Technical inefficiency raised costs by about 8.5% while
allocative inefficiency raised costs by about 9.2%.
Kumbhakar (1988) adapts the technical/allocative inefficiency framework to panel
data, assuming that productivity is constant across all firms and time but that technical
inefficiency varies by firm. The author applies this model to Class I Railroads and
estimates input demand to correct for possible endogeneity and separate technical and
allocative inefficiency. As expected, the author finds sizable variation in inefficiency across
firms.
Many researchers have found success in using Bayesian methods to estimate SF
models. Generally, other estimation procedures such as maximum likelihood estimation
can produce unstable estimates of SF model parameters (van Den Broeck et al., 1994).
Further, the parameter uncertainty expressed by standard methods may not be accurate,
especially for small sample sizes (Koop et al., 1995). Bayesian methods are able to
properly express parameter uncertainty for large and small samples alike and tend to
produce more stable estimates. Recent research by Yan et al. (2009) have introduced
Bayesian estimation and extended the SF framework to analyze to analyze panel data
and models productivity and inefficiency in a flexible manner. The authors assume
productivity follows a deterministic trend shared by all firms and inefficiency is a random
effect across firms with structural breaks across time. In using this model to analyze
container ports, the author finds productivity increases by about 4.4% per year and that
inefficiency showed heterogeneity both other firms and across time.
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Productivity of Railroads
Productivity of railroads has long been a topic of interest to regulators and
researchers. Worries about the efficiency and productivity of railroads was a major
impetus for the partial deregulation of the railroad industry in the 1970s (Bitzan and
Wilson, 2007). Proponents of deregulation argued that because of the development and
improvement of other modes of shipping like planes, barges, and trucks and because of
changes in the mix of products being shipped, existing regulation intended to promote
competition for the majority of the 20th century were hindering efficiency and limiting
the cost-viability of the industry (Winston et al., 1990). Following deregulation, firms
were more easily able to take advantage of economies of scale by merging and could reduce
costs by abandoning rail lines that were unprofitable (Bitzan and Keeler, 2007).
Of course, there has been much interest in how these changes have affected
productivity. Additionally, in the light of the different characteristics and actions that
firms took after deregulation, there is interest in how firms differentially progressed
following deregulation and what factors led to those differences. Finally, the ultimate
prospects for the industry remain unclear; recent declines in aggregate demand have
further cut into firm profits and other modes of transportation continue to improve.
Many studies that examine railroad productivity have been conducted, and questions
about many aspects of the industry have been addressed. Caves et al. (1981b) began the
investigation into changes in the industry and its effect on productivity and viability. The
authors found that the industry was quickly becoming more productive prior to 1963;
productivity growth was estimated to be 3.5% per year on average during the period from
1955 to 1963. However, in the following period from 1963 to 1974, productivity grew at
a much slower rate, only 0.6% per year on average. The authors posit that in the early
period, many firms began small and were able to exercise economies of scale as they grew
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through the late 1950s and early 1960s. The growth of the size of these firms slowed and
most excess capacity was filled by the mid 1960s, leading to slower productivity growth
through the mid 1970s. In accompaniment with changes in the industry, this slowing
growth led many to worry about its ultimate survival and spurred its partial deregulation.
A crucial question for regulators is whether and by how much partial deregulation
helped the industry. Tretheway et al. (1997) indirectly address this question by examining
productivity and performance of Canadian railways, which underwent partial pricing
deregulation in 1967, and compared with U.S. railroads, which were partially deregulated
later in 1976 and 1980. While Canadian railroads had significantly higher productivity
growth than U.S. railroads prior to the deregulation of the U.S. rail industry, U.S.
railroads saw productivity growing between 1.3% and 1.5% per annum faster than
Candian railways between 1981 and 1988. The authors conclude that this increased
growth was due to reductions in the amount of inputs being used as well as higher traffic
density in the U.S. While partial deregulation was not necessarily responsible for these
changes, it did provide an environment where firms could more easily merge, thereby
taking advantage of economies of scale, and had greater flexibility in abandoning routes,
which could have lead railroads to find a more advantageous traffic density.
Further, while it was clear that some kind of intervention was needed to ensure the
viability of the U.S. rail industry, there have been questions over exactly what type of
intervention would be most beneficial to firms. Apart from deregulation, which aims to
utilize free-market principles to improve the efficiency and viability of firms, the most
commonly suggested intervention is public ownership of railways. Public ownership of the
entire rail industry has not been investigated since such a program has not been enacted,
but several studies have looked into public ownership of firms and appropriation of public
funds towards private railways. Caves and Christensen (1980) compare the publicly-owned
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Canadian National Railway (CN) with the privately owned Canadian Pacific Railway
(CP). Opponents of public ownership worry that firms won’t face the proper incentives
to minimize costs and improve efficiency. The authors found that competitive pressures
both between CN and CP and from other modes of transportation were very strong; as
a result, both railways experienced similar productivity growth. Due to an abundance of
unprofitable lines, CN initially had lower productivity at the beginning of the sample in
1956; however, both CN and CP aggressively abandoned track through 1967 and saw their
productivities converge and continue to grow at a similar rate through 1974.
Rather than owning railways outright, governments can appropriate funds towards
supporting rail operations. Similar to completely publicly-owned firms, railroads that
receive subsidies may not have the incentive to minimize costs and maximize efficiency
absent sufficient competitive pressures. Oum and Yu (1994) consider railways in nineteen
OECD countries8 and investigate the effect of public funding and firms’ autonomy from
their public funders on efficiency. Since many of the firms did not see competition from
other railroads or other forms of competition, efficiency tended to be higher for less
publicly funded firms and for firms that had a greater degree of autonomy. In all, whether
public funding or ownership is beneficial or detrimental is extremely dependent on whether
firms will face competition; when they don’t, railways will not have the incentive to
improve and will tend not to do so as a result.
Conceptual Framework
Fundamentally, productivity research compares production plans and determines how
much of the difference in output is due to increased use of inputs and how much is due to
changes in productivity. An example of this decomposition is shown graphically in Figure
8Contrary to many studies of the U.S. rail industry, the railways in this study transport mostly
passengers rather than freight.
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1. In this example, I consider an output that uses two inputs Xi and Xj. In practice, the
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FIGURE 7. Input Substitution and Productivity
researcher is faced with two production plans, given by P0 and P1 in the figure, and knows
their associated levels of output Q0 and Q1. The two plans are on two different isoquant
curves, given by A0F (X) = Q0 and A1F (X) = Q1. These differ only by a productivity
factor, and the researcher’s goal is to estimate the growth of productivity from A0 to A1.
In changing production from P0 to P1, the firm can first change the composition of inputs
it uses to most efficiently produce P1; this is called input substitution and is shown in
the graph by the shift from P0 to ‹P0. Since P0 and ‹P0 are on the same isoquant, they
produce the same level of output, i.e., A0F (P0) = A0F (‹P0). The firm can also increase
the amount of inputs it uses; this is shown in the graph by the movement from ‹P0 to ‹P1,
where A0F (‹P1) = A0F (P1). Then, the proportional growth in output due to increased
inputs is
A0F (‹P1)
A0F (‹P0) = F (P1)F (P0) . (3.2)
Finally, output can increase due to changes in productivity, shown in the graph by the
shift from ‹P1 to P1. The proportional growth in output due to the increase in productivity
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is given by
A1F (P1)
A0F (‹P1) = A1F (P1)A0F (P1) = A1A0 . (3.3)
Overall, the total proportional change in production is given by
Q1
Q0
=
A1
A0
F (P1)
F (P0)
. (3.4)
To reiterate, the ratio A1/A0 represents the proportional increase in productivity while
the quotient F (P1)/F (P0) represents the proportional increase in output due to increased
inputs.
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FIGURE 8. Estimating Productivity With Linearization
The above decomposition assumes the researcher knows the shape and position
of the isoquants (and therefore also knows the production function). In practice, this
is rarely true, and researchers have relied on a number of techniques to approximate or
infer the shape of the production function. The use of Taylor approximations has been
very prevalent in productivity estimation. These approximations have been popular
largely because of their flexibility; apart from differentiability, Taylor approximations
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make no assumptions on the shape of the production function and as a result may be
used in a variety of contexts. Further, by including more terms in the approximation, it
can be made as accurate as desired, subject to data restrictions. To see how this affects
estimation of productivity, consider Figure 2; the dotted line represents the linearization of
the production function around the point P0. In practice, the researcher does not observe
the isoquant A0F (X) = Q0 but instead can only approximate its form. The researcher
would then estimate input substitution as the shift from P0 to ‹P0. The proportional
change in output due to increased use of inputs would be estimated as the shift from ‹P0 to‹P1. Finally, the change in output due to increased productivity is estimated to be the shift
from ‹P1 to P1. Comparing these results to Figure 1, we can see that the researcher would
overestimate productivity in this example. Naturally, more complex Taylor approximations
can be used, which would decrease the approximation bias in productivity estimates.
While having been used extensively in the literature, the simple framework presented
above suffers from theoretical and practical issues. First, as illustrated above, productivity
estimates could be biased due to errors in approximating the production function.
Many have worked to reduce these errors by using higher order approximations, but
unfortunately approximation error can never be eliminated because the approximations
are never exact. As noted previously, some researchers have found success in using data
envelopment analysis (DEA) to non-parametrically estimate the production frontier (and
therefore production function).
Additionally, the above framework has encountered issues in estimation. Specifically,
researchers have historically used a deterministic production function and have
inferred that any deviations from that function (i.e., residuals) are due to differences in
productivity. Of course, there are many channels through which errors can propagate.
For example, in addition to approximation and measurement error, inefficiency, defined as
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deviation from maximum possible output, can affect the level of production independent of
changes in productivity. As discussed in greater length in Section 3.3, stochastic frontier
(SF) analysis works to separately identify these various sources of error by imparting
structure on their form.
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FIGURE 9. Productivity and Changing Technology
Finally, the method of identifying productivity described above ignores the
possibility that the production technology could change. This will lead to a bias in the
estimate of productivity. As an example, consider Figure 3, which shows two isoquants
that describe different production technologies. The function F1 represents the new
production technology and F0 represents the original. Since the isoquant is relatively
less steep under F1 than F0, the input Xj is more productive under the new production
technology. The firm increases production from Q0 to Q1 through a few different channels.
First, the production technology changes, which changes the productivity of inputs, which
in turn affects output. The proportional change in productivity due to innovation is shown
in Figure 3 by the movement from P0 to “P0. Notice that in this example, the production
technology is becoming less efficient since it requires more of both inputs to produce the
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quantity Q1, holding productivity constant. Then, the firm can substitute inputs to more
efficiently produce Q1, which is shown by the movement from “P0 to ‹P0. Next, the firm
can increase the amount of inputs it uses, shown in the shift from ‹P0 to ‹P1. In practice,
the researcher cannot separately identify the change in technology from the increased
use of inputs because those changes occur simultaneously. However, the researcher can
observe the sum of these effects, shown in the graph by the movement from P0 to “P1. The
proportional change in output due to innovations and increases in inputs is quantified by
A0F1(“P1)
A0F0(P0)
=
F1(P1)
F0(P0)
. (3.5)
Finally, the change in productivity due to factors other than technological change is shown
by the movement from ‹P1 to P1, which can be written as
A1F1(P1)
A0F1(‹P1) = A1F1(P1)A0F1(P1) = A1A0 . (3.6)
The total change in production can then be expressed as
Q1
Q0
=
A1
A0
F1(P1)
F0(P0)
(3.7)
=
A1
A0
F1(P1)
F1(P0)
F1(P0)
F0(P0)
. (3.8)
Here, A1/A0 represents the proportional change in productivity, F1(P1)/F1(P0) represents
the proportional change in output due to increasing inputs, and F1(P0)/F0(P0) represents
the proportional change in output due to changing technology using the inputs P0. Thus,
conditional on approximating the production function and how it evolves over time, the
researcher can separately identify changes in output due to increased inputs, improvements
in technology, and increases in productivity due to non-innovative factors.
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In my analysis of changing productivity, there are a few key values of interest derived
above. First, F1(P0)/F0(P0) denotes the change in productivity due to innovation and
A1/A0 represents the proportional change in productivity due to factors other than
technological change. As a result, the product A1F1(P0)/A0F0(P0) is the total change in
productivity due to any factor, which I refer to as technology-inclusive productivity growth.
I also focus on another value, F1(P1)/F0(P1), which measures technology’s contribution to
productivity growth using the new inputs P1. By comparing this value to F1(P0)/F0(P0),
inferences can be made about the benefits of input substitution:
– If F1(P0)/F0(P0) > F1(P1)/F0(P1), the new technology increases output more for the
original plan than for the new plan. Thus, the firm substituted towards inputs that
innovation made less productive.
– If F1(P0)/F0(P0) < F1(P1)/F0(P1), the new technology increases output more for the
new plan than for the original plan. This indicates that the firm substituted towards
factors that technology change made more productive.
Next, I turn to explaining how I approximate the shape of the production function.
Consider the output of a firm i in year t, given by Qit. Suppose that the firm’s production
technology is described by
Qit = AitFt(Xit; Φit)∆it, (3.9)
where αit is a productivity factor, Xit is a vector of inputs, ϕit is a vector of network
characteristics, and ∆it is a constant between zero and one describing efficiency. While
it is not possible to determine the exact shape of Ft, one can approximate it using the
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second order Taylor approximation of lnQit around zero:
qit ≈ αit − δit +
∑
j
∂ lnFt
∂ lnXj
xjit +
∑
j
∂ lnFt
∂ ln Φj
ϕjit
+
1
2!
∑
j
∑
k
∂2 lnFt
∂ lnXj∂ lnXk
xjitx
k
it
+
1
2!
∑
j
∑
k
∂2 lnFt
∂ ln Φj∂ ln Φk
ϕjitϕ
k
it
+
1
2!
∑
j
∑
k
∂2 lnFt
∂ lnXj∂ ln Φk
xjitϕ
k
it. (3.10)
Here, lower-case variables are log-transformed versions of upper case variables, and
superscripts index vectors of variables. As an exception, ∆it = exp(−δit), and δit is
restricted to be positive to ensure that the efficiency term ∆it is between zero and one.
I first assume that inputs and network characteristics are separable in production, so
that ∂
2 lnFt
∂ lnXj∂ ln Φk
= 0 for all j and k. Also, under a modest assumption on Ft,
9 the second
derivatives of Ft will be symmetric.
10 Using these assumptions, equation (4.2) becomes
qit ≈ αit − δit +
∑
j
∂ lnFt
∂ lnXj
xjit +
∑
j
∂ lnFt
∂ ln Φj
ϕjit
+
1
2
∑
j
∂2 lnFt
∂(lnXj)2
(xjit)
2 +
1
2
∑
j
∂2 lnFt
∂(ln Φj)2
(ϕjit)
2
+
∑
j
∑
k>j
∂2 lnFt
∂ lnXj∂ lnXk
xjitx
k
it
+
∑
j
∑
k>j
∂2 lnFt
∂ ln Φj∂ ln Φk
ϕjitϕ
k
it. (3.11)
9Specifically, I assume that the second derivatives of Ft are continuous in a neighborhood of zero.
10That is, ∂
2 lnFt
∂ lnXj∂ lnXk
= ∂
2 lnFt
∂ lnXk∂ lnXj
for all j and k.
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Renaming partial derivatives with respect to inputs βt and those with respect to network
characteristics θt, equation (3.11) can be rewritten to arrive at the familiar translog form:
qit ≈ αit − δit +
∑
j
βtjx
j
it +
∑
j
θtjϕ
j
it
+
∑
j
βtjj(x
j
it)
2 +
∑
j
θtjj(ϕ
j
it)
2
+
∑
j
∑
k>j
βtjkx
k
itx
j
it +
∑
j
∑
k>j
θtjkϕ
k
itϕ
j
it. (3.12)
Let xit be the matrix of all log-inputs, all log-inputs squared, and all of the interactions
between log-inputs (i.e., containing each xjit, (x
j
it)
2, and xjitx
k
it), and let ϕit be similarly
defined. Then, equation (4.3) can be expressed in vector form as
qit ≈ αit − δit + xitβt + ϕitθt. (3.13)
Naturally, there is some error incurred in the approximation and measurement of qit. I
label this approximation error εit, so that
qit = αit − δit + xitβt + ϕitθt + εit. (3.14)
Data
The data used in this analysis come from R1 forms, collected and presented by
the United States Surface Transportation Board (STB). These forms are published
annually and contain financial information and operating statistics for all Class I railroads,
including aggregate output and input use and characteristics of each firm’s network. The
time span of the sample has been restricted to the period from 1999 to 2014; this analysis
is interested in how productivity has evolved since Class I railroads fully merged in 1999.
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The Class I railroads in this sample are Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), the
Canadian National Railway (CN), CSX Transportation (CSX), the Kansas City Southern
Railway (KCS), the Norfolk Southern Railway (NS), the Soo Line Railroad (SOO),11 and
the Union Pacific Railroad (UP).
The dependent variable in this analysis is aggregate revenue-ton-miles, which are
defined as one ton of product shipped one mile that generates revenue. Production of
revenue-ton-miles is described by input use and network characteristics. I use amounts
of locomotives and cars, quantity of fuel consumed, and total hours of labor worked,
and investment per mile of road as inputs.12 Following Friedlaender and Spady (1981),
I opt to include investment in firms’ networks as an input and include network size as a
characteristic of output. The authors found that including network size as input results in
negative output elasticities with respect to the network due to economies of density.
Characteristics of each firm’s network are crucial in describing production, especially
aggregate production, in the railroad industry. Tretheway et al. (1997) investigate the
effect of aggregation on the estimates of productivity in the rail industry. The authors
estimate productivity using both aggregate and disaggregate data and found significant
differences. Using aggregate output assumes that the mix of products being shipped
remains constant over time. If, for example, firms instead shift to shipping products that
require fewer inputs, productivity would appear to increase even if productive capability
remained constant. One would ideally use disaggregated data in their analyses; however,
only aggregated data is publicly available, so it is important to control for other factors
11While Canadian Pacific Railway has owned the Soo Line Railroad since 1990, Soo changed in name to
Canadian Pacific in the early 2000s; I will continue to refer to this railroad as SOO.
12Miles of road is defined as the total length of non-redundant track operated by a railroad. Investment
was deflated using the GDP price deflator.
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that could be correlated with aggregate input use but not necessarily with productive
potential.
There are several network characteristics that are important to consider. First, as
noted in Tretheway et al. (1997), traffic mix is a crucial feature of railroad networks.
The mix of traffic is dependent both on the types of goods being shipped as well as
types of shipments that traverse the network. In this analysis I include the percentage
of shipments that carry bulk products13 as a measure of product mix and the percentage
of shipments that are unit train shipments as a measure of shipment mix. Bitzan and
Keeler (2007) additionally find that the shipment distance is important in describing
costs.14 The percentage of shipments that are unit train shipments partially captures
aspects of shipment distances, and I additionally include the average length of haul into
this analysis. Friedlaender and Spady (1981) find that network size is a crucial factor in
transportation costs, so I also include miles of road for each firm. Finally, the quality of a
railroad’s track will determine how efficiently trains can traverse the network and can also
influence maintenance costs. Following Wilson (1997), I use average locomotive speed as a
measure of network quality.
Descriptive statistics for each of these variables are presented in Table 1. Means and
standard deviations are given for each firm and as an average over all firms. The sample
spans sixteen years, and the descriptive statistics are averaged over time.
13I define bulk products as belonging to one of the following categories: Metallic ores, nonmetallic
minerals (not fuels), waste/scrap metals, clay/concrete/glass/stone, farm products.
14This comes at no surprise since, at the very least, short shipments require more fuel per revenue-ton-
mile.
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Empirical Models
In the analyzing the productivity and efficiency of firms, we are most interested in
estimating their respective parameters αit and δit in equation (3.14). However, all of the
parameters of equation (3.14) cannot be separately identified in a standard regression
framework. There are a number of ways to manipulate this model so that productivity
and efficiency can be identified, and in this section I describe the three models I use in this
paper.
Deterministic Trend in Productivity, Constant Technology
This model first assumes that technology and the effect of network characteristics
are constant across time, so that βt = β and θt = θ. I also assume that each firm has
its own initial productivity which then follows a deterministic linear trend shared by all
firms. Further, the model assumes that inefficiency is constant across time (but is allowed
to vary by firm); as a result, δit = δi. Finally, recall that δi was restricted to be greater
than zero; following the majority of the stochastic frontier literature, I assume δi has a
half-normal distribution centered and truncated at zero. Inefficiency can be separately
identified from productivity both because they have different dynamics across time15
and because inefficiency is strictly greater than zero. The model can be expressed in the
following relations.
qit = αit + xitβ + ϕitθ − δi + εit
αit = αi + τt
αi ∼ N(µα, σα)
εit ∼ N(0, σε)
δi ∼ N+(0, σδ)
15That is, inefficiency is assumed to be static while productivity follows a linear trend.
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Conditional on having prior distributions over the parameters, this model can be
estimated using Gibbs sampling. For a detailed description of the sampler, see Section
9.1.1 in the Appendix.
Random Walk in Productivity, Constant Technology
This model is similar to the previous model, but focuses on modeling productivity
in a more flexible way than with a deterministic trend. Specifically, I assume that
productivity follows a random walk with drift that is independent for each firm.
This type of process has been used in a number of applications and can model many
processes, especially those that exhibit persistence, flexibly and effectively.16 Importantly,
productivity likely exhibits persistence because firms don’t tend to change their exact
methods of production by a significant on an annual basis, and as a result, productivity
in one year will be dependent on productivity in the previous year.
The previous model also assumed that productivity growth was constant across all
firms; as a result, the estimates of productivity growth in that model are best viewed as
the average productivity growth in the industry. It is more likely that each firm follows its
own trend in productivity due to differences in how firms operate. This model relaxes the
common trend assumption and allows each firm to have its own productivity trend.
I maintain all of the other assumptions of the model, which is written below.
16For some examples of how time-varying parameters have been used in a variety of contexts, see
Leybourne (1993), Mazzocchi (2003), and Del Negro and Otrok (2008).
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qit = αit + xitβ + ϕitθ − δi + εit
αit = αit−1 + τi + ηit ; t > 0
αi0 ∼ N(µα, σα)
εit ∼ N(0, σε)
δi ∼ N+(0, σδ)
ηit ∼ N(0, ση)
Given assumptions of the prior distributions of each parameter, which can be
found in Section 9.1.2 of the Appendix, this model can be estimated using Gibbs
sampling. Exact evaluation of the likelihood is complicated by the random-walk process
in productivity, but is made possible via the Kalman filter. A review of the methodology
for using the Kalman filter to estimate standard regression models with time-varying
parameters in a Bayesian framework is given in Sarris (1973). While stochastic frontier
models and time-varying parameter models have been estimated, I am not aware of any
published research that combines the two to examine dynamic changes in productivity.
Random Walk in Productivity and Technology
This model presents an additional extension of the previous model. I maintain the
assumption that productivity follows a random walk with drift but relax the assumption
that technology remains constant over the time frame of the sample. There are a couple
of perspectives that justify relaxing this assumption. First, firms are constantly striving to
reduce costs and make innovations to their production technology to further that goal. As
discussed in Section 2, firms have invested large amounts in improving improving their
networks and pursuing innovation. Ignoring these innovations would lead to a bias in
productivity, as discussed in Section 3.1.
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A second line of reasoning refers back to the original definition of productivity:
The marginal amount of output that can be produced using an additional unit of
real resources. As the production technology changes, the combination of inputs that
constitutes one unit of real resources will change; not only will the amount of output that
can be produced with one unit of real inputs change, but firms will alter the composition
of inputs they use as factor productivities change at differing rates. Assuming that
technology remains constant over time, an increase in real expenditures will increase all
inputs by a constant fixed amount, which will increase output by a fixed amount, after
controlling for productivity.
Instead of assuming a technology that is constant across firms and time, I assume
that all firms share the production technology (up to their multiplicative productivity) in
a given year, but that technology is allowed to change over time. The primary estimating
equation then becomes
qit = αit + xitβt + ϕitθ − δi + εit. (3.17)
The data prevent the separate identification of βt for each year; instead, I propose that
βt follows a random walk with drift. Once again, I expect that βt will exhibit persistence
because new technology tends to adapt existing technology. The other assumptions of the
model remain the same, which can be expressed in the following relations.
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qit = αit + xitβt + ϕitθ − δi + εit
αit = αit−1 + τi + ηit ; t > 0
βt = βt−1 + ρ+ ψt ; t > 0
αi0 ∼ N(µα, σα)
β0 ∼ N(µβ,Σβ)
εit ∼ N(0, σε)
δi ∼ N+(0, σδ)
ηit ∼ N(0, ση)
ψt ∼ N(0,Σψ)
Once again, due to the random-walk process in productivity and technology
parameters, exact evaluation of the likelihood function is difficult but is possible by using
the Kalman filter; the general estimation procedure in a Bayesian context is described
in Sarris (1973). Once prior distributions are assigned to each parameter, the model
can be estimated using Gibbs sampling. A full description of the model, including prior
assumptions, can be found in Section 9.1.3 in the Appendix.
Results
This section presents results for each of the three models detailed in Section
6. Each of these models was estimated using Gibbs sampling, a Bayesian estimation
technique; unlike classical statistical methods which produce a point estimate for each
parameter, Bayesian methods like Gibbs sampling produce a distribution for each
parameter that is dependent on prior assumptions, the data, and the structure of the
model. Consequentially, I present statistics describing the distribution of each parameter.
The distributions of parameters, especially of productivity, have relatively high variance;
since many of these parameters are then exponentiated to get their economically-intuitive
value, their distributions show significant skew. As a result, I present only estimated
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medians for each parameter as these will give a better view of the central tendency of
these distributions. Parameter estimates for each model estimated are presented in Table
2.
Deterministic Trend in Productivity, Constant Technology
Median estimates from the model with a deterministic trend in productivity and
static technology are presented in the Baseline column of Table 2, and median estimates of
annual productivity for each firm are plotted in Figure 4. While this is the most basic
model presented in this paper, it provides some general insight into productivity and
growth in the industry. First, I estimate that average productivity growth was modest
over the period from 1999 to 2014, with median estimates of 1.2% growth per year on
average across all firms. There is also heterogeneity in productivity across firms; CN, CSX,
NS, and UP show the highest levels of productivity, between 1.65 and 1.708 in 2014, while
KCS has the lowest productivity at 1.52 in 2014. Mean productivity was estimated to be
1.661 in 2014. Estimates of efficiency range from 78.2% to 86.4%, with a mean of 81.4%
across firms.
As discussed in Section 4, the increase in output that results from a input
substitution and increased input usage is given by F (Xit)/F (Xi0), which is represented
by exp((Xit −Xi0)β) in the empirical model. A plot of the proportional increase in output
due to changing input quantities is given in Figure 5. CN, KCS, and the Soo Line all saw
increases in input use over the sample, CSX, NS, and UP all decreased input use, and
BNSF saw little change in output due to changing inputs.
Using a Bayesian estimation framework permits direct evaluation of the probability
that a parameter of interest, like productivity growth, lies within a given range.
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TABLE 9. Posterior Medians and Median Absolute Deviations
Constant Changing
Baseline Technology Technology
Productivity in 2014 (exp(α))
BNSF 1.602 (2.345) 2.594 (0.622) 1.026 (1.513)
CN 1.708 (2.5) 4.962 (1.557) 1.004 (1.487)
CSX 1.682 (2.463) 4.077 (1.045) 0.979 (1.451)
KCS 1.52 (2.224) 2.95 (0.809) 0.873 (1.295)
NS 1.675 (2.453) 3.831 (1.058) 1.116 (1.655)
SOO 1.534 (2.245) 3.296 (1.023) 1.074 (1.592)
UP 1.65 (2.417) 3.82 (0.98) 0.891 (1.321)
Efficiency (exp(−δ))
BNSF 0.814 (0.187) 0.938 (0.056) 0.612 (0.357)
CN 0.864 (0.138) 0.934 (0.043) 0.611 (0.363)
CSX 0.851 (0.16) 0.949 (0.04) 0.611 (0.351)
KCS 0.814 (0.191) 0.925 (0.061) 0.63 (0.357)
NS 0.864 (0.147) 0.954 (0.043) 0.618 (0.356)
SOO 0.782 (0.213) 0.943 (0.054) 0.623 (0.35)
UP 0.85 (0.159) 0.919 (0.064) 0.62 (0.356)
Productivity Trend (τ) 0.012 (0.005)
BNSF 0.002 (0.008) -0.01 (0.582)
CN 0.037 (0.016) 0.008 (0.669)
CSX 0.028 (0.009) 0.001 (0.432)
KCS 0.007 (0.007) -0.008 (0.646)
NS 0.021 (0.007) -0.003 (0.455)
SOO 0.018 (0.008) -0.01 (0.58)
UP 0.021 (0.008) -0.007 (0.597)
Input Parameters
Locomotives -0.249 (1.8) -2.522 (1.216) 0.161 (7.774)
Cars -0.728 (1.894) -1.076 (1.57) 0.245 (7.647)
Road 1.965 (1.82) 0.216 (1.62) 0.383 (7.359)
Fuel 1.354 (1.795) 2.928 (1.274) 0.474 (6.53)
Labor -0.916 (2.088) 1.185 (2.208) 0.476 (6.963)
(Locomotives)2 -0.21 (0.144) -0.46 (0.126) 0.049 (3.475)
(Cars)2 0.586 (0.145) 0.341 (0.303) -0.173 (4.978)
(Road)2 -0.173 (0.114) -0.206 (0.12) 0.22 (3.228)
(Fuel)2 0.165 (0.127) 0.034 (0.153) 0.072 (3.379)
(Labor)2 0.727 (0.401) -0.287 (0.259) 0.102 (4.505)
(Locomotives):(Cars) -0.009 (0.207) -0.009 (0.206) -0.008 (5.846)
(Locomotives):(Road) -0.147 (0.183) -0.486 (0.21) 0.123 (4.963)
(Locomotives):(Fuel) 0.199 (0.204) 0.792 (0.193) 0.059 (4.82)
(Locomotives):(Labor) 0.065 (0.332) -0.022 (0.399) -0.277 (5.417)
(Cars):(Road) 0.082 (0.2) 0.051 (0.179) 0.126 (5.262)
(Cars):(Fuel) 0.285 (0.285) -0.811 (0.216) -0.016 (5.669)
(Cars):(Labor) -1.049 (0.534) 0.61 (0.386) 0.157 (6.147)
(Road):(Fuel) 0.076 (0.196) 0.137 (0.217) -0.277 (4.45)
(Road):(Labor) 0.105 (0.367) 0.348 (0.332) -0.219 (5.076)
(Fuel):(Labor) -0.765 (0.264) -0.121 (0.21) 0.068 (5.884)
Network Characteristics
Avg. Length of Haul 1.592 (1.972) -0.99 (2.241) 0.047 (2.939)
Avg. Speed 0.685 (1.982) -1.438 (1.194) 0.035 (2.926)
Miles of Road -0.788 (1.585) -0.541 (1.344) 0.115 (2.88)
% Unit -3.558 (1.307) -2.04 (1.077) -0.046 (2.891)
% Bulk 2.178 (1.387) 1.544 (1.049) 0.019 (2.983)
(Avg. Length of Haul)2 -0.287 (0.205) 0.027 (0.164) 0.015 (1.66)
(Avg. Speed)2 -0.447 (0.316) -0.187 (0.21) 0.022 (2.497)
(Miles of Road)2 0.061 (0.083) 0.059 (0.066) -0.014 (0.899)
(% Unit)2 -0.069 (0.122) 0.004 (0.089) -0.053 (2.268)
(% Bulk)2 -0.061 (0.147) 0.014 (0.108) -0.095 (2.618)
(Avg. Length of Haul):(Avg. Speed) 0.675 (0.447) 0.51 (0.277) -0.002 (2.535)
(Avg. Length of Haul):(Miles of Road) 0.136 (0.167) 0.049 (0.119) 0.06 (2.103)
(Avg. Length of Haul):(% Unit) 0.776 (0.278) 0.508 (0.219) 0.021 (2.273)
(Avg. Length of Haul):(% Bulk) -0.189 (0.215) -0.267 (0.141) -0.023 (2.351)
(Avg. Speed):(Miles of Road) -0.338 (0.177) -0.197 (0.09) 0.012 (1.908)
(Avg. Speed):(% Unit) -0.113 (0.33) -0.076 (0.148) -0.048 (2.424)
(Avg. Speed):(% Bulk) -0.462 (0.344) -0.479 (0.152) 0.034 (2.672)
(Miles of Road):(% Unit) -0.095 (0.1) -0.047 (0.078) 0.035 (1.51)
(Miles of Road):(% Bulk) 0.026 (0.097) 0.178 (0.06) -0.054 (1.654)
(% Unit):(% Bulk) -0.014 (0.17) 0.12 (0.12) 0.012 (2.641)
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FIGURE 10. Railroad Productivity as a Deterministic Trend
Specifically, the probability that a parameter $ lies within a set S is
Pr($ ∈ S) =
∫
I($ ∈ S)p($|D)d$, (3.19)
where I(·) is an indicator function and p($|D) is the posterior distribution of $
conditional on the data D. I estimate the probability that average productivity increased
(i.e., Pr(τ > 1)) is 99.314%.
In light of these results, one can safely conclude that there has been growth in
average productivity since total consolidation in 1999. This is reassuring, the flexibility
granted to firms by partial deregulation seems to have set the groundwork for continued
long-term growth and sustained viability. However, while the industry appears to be
growing on average, the performance of individual firms is not clear. To investigate how
each railroad has progressed, I turn to my second model.
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FIGURE 11. Increase in Output From Change in Inputs
Random Walk in Productivity, Constant Technology
Median estimates from the random walk in productivity model are presented in
the Constant Technology column in Table 2. There are several modest differences from
the previous model’s results. First, estimates of productivity and efficiency are lower
for this model; mean productivity is estimated to be 3.684 in 2014 and mean efficiency
was estimated to be 92.9%. I estimate that effective productivity (i.e., the product of
productivity and efficiency) was 3.385 in 2014. Trends in productivity show marked
heterogeneity across firms, and mean productivity growth is estimated to be 1.96% per
year, similar to the 1.2% growth estimated by the previous model.
Productivity for each firm over time is presented in Figures 6 and 7 in two ways.
Figure 6 shows the expectation of firm productivity conditional on firm trends and
information in the year 1999; this is identical to the deterministic part of productivity.
Figure 7 shows estimated productivity, which includes both the trend as well as the
random walk in productivity. The inclusion of the random walk is important because it
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FIGURE 12. Expected Railroad Productivity as a Random Walk With Drift
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FIGURE 13. Estimated Railroad Productivity as a Random Walk With Drift
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reflects actual year-to-year variation in productivity that cannot be captured by a simple
deterministic trend. There are many factors that could potentially affect productivity, and
it would be neither technically feasible nor even possible given data restrictions to include
them all into the model. By assuming productivity follows a random walk with trend,
variation in productivity can be captured flexibly.17
One can quickly see that actual productivity differs from its expected value. As an
example, NS was expected to have productivity growth of 2.1% per year over the course
of the sample; in actuality, NS received two negative shocks to productivity in 2008 and
2009, which resulted in lower estimated productivity growth of 1.889% per year. This
indicates that there are other factors influencing productivity that cannot be described
by changes in input use and a simple trend. As explained previously, it can be difficult to
attribute an exact cause to these fluctuations.
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
2000 2005 2010
Year
Pr
op
or
tio
na
l C
ha
ng
e 
in
 O
ut
pu
t
Railroad
BNSF
CN
CSX
KCS
NS
SOO
UP
FIGURE 14. Increase in Output From Change in Inputs
17Of course, this assumption comes at a cost. While variation in productivity can be identified, the
exact source of this variation cannot. As a result, one can only use institutional knowledge to posit
why firms see fluctuations in productivity; in order to empirically identify what factors drive changes in
productivity, those factors must be explicitly included in the model.
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Estimates of the effect of changing input use on output are shown in Figure 8.
Similar to the previous model, I find that BNSF, CN, KCS, and the Soo Line all increased
the quantity of inputs used while CSX, NS, and UP saw decreases in input quantities. As
noted earlier, CN and Soo Line also saw significant increases in productivity, indicating
both matched increased demand with a combination of neutral factors and increased
inputs.
I again estimate the probability that firms experience positive average growth in
productivity as well as the median value of annualized average growth between 1999
and 2014, and the results are given in Table 3. Estimates suggest that each firm saw
increases in productivity, with median estimates between 0.235% to 3.551% per annum,
and probability of productivity growth between 65.7% and 100%. Further, I estimate the
probability that all firms experience positive growth in productivity is 63.424%.
TABLE 10. Average Productivity Growth
Firm Annual Productivity Growth Probability of Increase
BNSF 0.235% (0.006) 65.7%
CN 3.551% (0.012) 100%
CSX 2.474% (0.007) 99.908%
KCS 0.816% (0.006) 94.102%
NS 1.889% (0.005) 99.992%
SOO 1.657% (0.006) 99.926%
UP 1.869% (0.006) 99.996%
These results offer optimistic outcomes for some firms and a more modest outlook for
others. Similar to Tretheway et al. (1997), which found that CN showed high productivity
growth through 1991, I estimate that CN has the highest productivity in 2014 as well as
the highest growth rate over the sample. As noted by previous research, CN continued to
operate on several less-profitable lines and had yet to fully take advantage of economies of
density through the 1990s; as CN continued to improve on those frontiers, its productivity
increased.
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On the other hand, the remainder of the railroads exhibit modest growth in
productivity. Some of these firms may no longer find it feasible to abandon lines and
make improvements to economies of density and instead must turn towards innovating
their production technology to realize higher growth. This model ignores the possibility of
technological change; to investigate whether firms have been able to increase productivity
through innovation, I turn to my third and final model.
Random Walk in Productivity and Technology
Median estimates from the changing technology model are presented in the Changing
Technology column in Table 2, and median estimated productivity for each firm is
plotted in Figure 9. As explained in Section 4, there are a few key values of interest in
the analysis of productivity in the light of changing technology. First, the productivity
growth estimated by this model does not include changes in productivity due to innovation
but instead reflects growth from factors other than innovation. Both CN and CSX
show growth in productivity due to non-innovative factors at 0.702% and 0.016% per
year, respectively, indicating those firms may still be able to abandon lines and improve
density to increase productivity. All other firms experience stagnating or even declining
productivity due to non-innovative factors at rates between 0.283% and 0.901% per year,
demonstrating that those other methods of increasing productivity are no longer feasible
for these railroads.
The growth in productivity due to technological change relative to the base year is
given by Xi0(βt − β0).18 A plot of the estimated change in productivity due to innovations
for each railroad is presented in Figure 10. Each railroad experienced positive average
growth in productivity due to innovations over the course of the sample. BNSF, KCS,
18Productivity growth due to innovation was given as F1(X0)/F0(X0). Note that this is an analogous
measure because ln(F1(X0)/F0(X0)) = f1(X0)− f0(X0) = X0β1 −X0β0 = X0(β1 − β0).
86
0.9
1.0
1.1
2000 2005 2010
Year
Es
tim
at
ed
 P
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty Railroad
BNSF
CN
CSX
KCS
NS
SOO
UP
FIGURE 15. Estimated Railroad Productivity Accounting For Changing Technology
Soo Line, and UP saw the largest productivity gains due to chnages in technology. On
the other hand, CSX, CN, and NS found more modest increases, indicating those firms
have relied more heavily on other methods to increase their productivity. While I have
a small sample of firms, I find that the large firms (i.e., BNSF and UP) are benefactors
of changing technology; this correlates with the finding of Rose and Joskow (1990) where
large firms are more likely to adopt innovations early due to risk preferences. A plot of
technology-inclusive productivity, the sum of productivity due to innovation and that due
to non-innovative factors, is presented in Figure 11. Overall, BNSF, CN, and Soo Line
have shown the highest growth in total productivity. KCS and UP experienced modest
gains in total productivity over the course of the sample, and all CSX and NS experienced
relatively little productivity growth.
Median estimates of average annual technology-inclusive productivity growth and the
probability that each firm experienced positive growth in productivity are given in Table
4. Productivity growth estimates are much more modest than in previous models; CN saw
the largest expected increase at 3.065% per annum, while NS experienced small decreases
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FIGURE 16. Estimated Change in Productivity Due to Innovations
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FIGURE 17. Estimated Productivity Including Effects of Innovation
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in productivity of 0.007% annually. I estimate the probability that all firms experienced
an increase in productivity between 1999 and 2014 is only 4.688%, indicating it is very
likely that at least one firm saw a decrease in productivity over the sample period.
TABLE 11. Average Productivity Growth
Firm Annual Productivity Growth Probability of Increase
BNSF 2.272% (0.367) 52.324%
CN 3.065% (0.666) 51.792%
CSX 0.037% (0.414) 50.036%
KCS 1.248% (0.468) 51.156%
NS -0.007% (0.395) 49.992%
SOO 2.79% (0.389) 53.064%
UP 1.623% (0.316) 52.028%
The change in output due to input substitution and increased input usage is shown
Figure 12. Most firms didn’t increased or even decreased the amount of inputs they used
over the sample, with the exception of CN. While CN saw decreases in productivity due to
technological change, especially before 2010, it dramatically increased its input use during
that time. This provides evidence that CN relied on increasing its input use rather than
increasing productivity through innovation, especially before 2010.
The preceding analysis examines how innovations affect the productivity of railroads’
original plan of production. To determine whether firms made changes that took
advantage of changing technology, namely by allocating more resources towards more
productive factors, one can examine how changing technology affects new production
plans. In Section 4, I described the comparison of two measures: Technology’s benefit
to the original production plan, Ft(Xt−1)/Ft−1(Xt−1), and the benefit of innovation to
the new production plan, Ft(Xt)/Ft−1(Xt). Since Ft(Xs) is expressible as exp(Xsβt) in
this model, these two ratios can be calculated as exp(Xt−1βt − Xt−1βt−1) and exp(Xtβt −
Xtβt−1), respectively. Recall that if the latter is greater than the former, then the firm
allocated resources towards factors that innovation made more productive; otherwise,
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FIGURE 18. Increase in Output From Change in Inputs
it made changes that clashed with technology change and must have found it cheaper
to increase productivity through means other than input substitution. To exhibit these
results, I calculate distributions of both values for each firm and year. Bayesian estimation
methods make it possible to evaluate the probability that one of these values exceeds the
other; I plot the probability that each firm substitutes towards more productive inputs19
in each year in Figure 10. Every railroad has near 50% probability of substituting towards
more productive inputs and no railroad appears to have consistent behavior. This shows
that firms are largely not able to anticipate changes in the relative productivity of inputs
and make allocative changes in response.
Bayesian Model Selection
An advantage of using a Bayesian estimation framework is that it allows for the
direct computation of model probabilities, which can be used for model selection and
19That is, I calculate the probability that Ft(Xt)/Ft−1(Xt) is greater than Ft(Xt−1)/Ft−1(Xt−1).
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FIGURE 19. Probability of Substituting Towards More Productive Input
averaging of results. Letting each of the previously discussed models be M1, M2, and M3,
respectively, the probability of model Mi being the correct model is
Pr(Mk|D) = Pr(D|Mk) Pr(Mk)
Pr(D)
=
Pr(D|Mk) Pr(Mk)∑
j Pr(D|Mj) Pr(Mj) , (3.20)
where Pr(D|Mk) is the marginal likelihood of the data D for model k and Pr(Mk) is the
prior probability of model k, chosen by the researcher. Direct evaluation of the marginal
likelihood is difficult in general, but can be computed using the methods described in Chib
and Jeliazkov (2001).
I assume a uniform prior probability over the above three models, and posterior
model probabilities are given in Table 3. The model that allows both productivity and
technology to follow a random walk with drift has the highest probability of being the
true model. The effects of changing technology have an important effect on productivity
changes, as can be seen from the relatively low probability of the model that only allows a
random walk in productivity and not in technological parameters.
91
TABLE 12. Posterior Model Probabilities
Model Prior Probability Posterior Probability
Deterministic trend 1/3 0.24311
Random walk in productivity 1/3 0.08665
Random walk in
1/3 0.67024
productivity and technology
TABLE 13. Average Productivity Growth
Firm Annual Productivity Growth Probability of Increase
BNSF 1.817% (0.247) 64.907%
CN 2.636% (0.449) 67.522%
CSX 0.513% (0.279) 66.337%
KCS 1.181% (0.315) 66.585%
NS 0.433% (0.266) 66.315%
SOO 2.287% (0.262) 68.368%
UP 1.524% (0.213) 67.68%
Finally, I calculate median productivity for each firm over time, median productivity
growth over the course of the sample, and the probability that firms experienced increases
in productivity between 1999 and 2014 using Bayesian model averaging, which calculates
parameters of interest for each model and weights them by their respective model
probabilities. Specifically, for a statistic of interest $, the average of $ over the models
is
E[$|D] = ∑
k
$k Pr(Mk|D),
where $k is the estimated value of $ in model k. Estimated productivity growth and
the probability that each firm experienced growth in productivity over the course of the
sample are given in Table 4, and figure 11 plots productivity averaged over the models for
each firm over time.
Model average results show that CN experienced an average annual productivity
growth of 2.636% per year between 1999 and 2014, the greatest of all firms in the sample;
CSX and NS showed the least growth, at 0.513% and 0.433%, respectively, while the
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FIGURE 20. Model Average of Productivity Over Time
remainder of the firms saw productivity growth between 1.181% and 2.287% annually.
Each firm had a relatively high probability of experiencing positive growth, between
64.907% and 68.368%. Finally, I calculate that the probability that all firms experienced
positive growth 32.782%, meaning it is more likely than not that at least one firm saw a
decrease in productivity between 1999 and 2014.
Conclusion
The level and growth of productivity offer important insight into the functioning
of an industry, from its economies of scale to important factors of growth and even
its long-term viability. The railroad industry has changed dramatically since partial
deregulation 1980, which occurred largely because of worries about regulation and its
effect on productivity growth. Many studies have examined the growth in productivity
immediately following the industry’s partial deregulation, but few have looked at how
productivity has changed since the industry became more stable in 1999. Following the
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massive changes that occurred through the 1980s and early 1990s, it is unlikely that
firms will be able to continue pursuing broad changes like line abandonment to increase
productivity. Instead, they need to turn towards improving technology and substituting
inputs towards more productive factors to increase their productivity.
Unfortunately, existing models of productivity fail to account for technological
change. In this paper, I develop a model that flexibly accounts for changes in productivity
and technology and use it to decompose changes in productivity into those caused by
innovation and those caused by other factors. To my knowledge, no published research
exists that separately identifies productivity growth due to technological change and
that due to broad non-innovative changes. Further, this model allows productivity
and technology to evolve flexibly over time and can produce estimates of the level of
productivity and its growth, which can inform key values in regulation. Finally, I discover
a metric that determines whether firms have allocated additional resources towards factors
that innovation makes more productive in order to realize further productivity gains. I
apply my model to the railroad industry to investigate the recent change in productivity
and to determine whether it is being driven by technological change or factors other than
innovation.
I find that each Class I railroad has likely seen productivity growth since 1999, but
the driving forces behind this growth differ. BNSF, KCS, Soo Line, and UP have seen
large increases in its productivity due to technological change, by as much as 60% between
1999 and 2014. On the other hand, CN, KCS, and NS saw much slower growth induced
by changing technology. Instead, these railroads relied on other methods to increase
productivity, such as continuing to abandon unprofitable lines. The probability that firms
substituted inputs towards factors that technological change makes more productive is
about 50%, with no discernible pattern across firms or over time, indicating that railroads
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are not able to anticipate innovations or simply aren’t adjusting inputs to take advantage
of technological change. Finally, I perform Bayesian model selection and find that the
model that allows for flexibility in both productivity and technology has the highest
probability of being the true model. Using Bayesian model averaging, I find that each firm
experienced modest growth in productivity between 1999 and 2014, with median estimates
ranging from 0.433% to 2.636% per year. This chapter investigates productivity broadly,
so to more clearly identify inefficiency in production and its relationship to regulation
and competition, I turn to my fourth chapter, “Competitive Pressures and Inefficiency in
Allocation.”
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CHAPTER IV
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES AND INEFFICIENCY IN ALLOCATION
Abstract
There is a wealth of literature that points to inefficiencies in production. Inefficiencies
can arise in the production of outputs from overutilization of inputs in the production
process (technical inefficiency) or from errors in optimization that misalign factor prices
and optimal input decisions (allocative inefficiency). In examinations of inefficiency, many
studies use an inflexible production technology that fails to account for differences in the
technology of firms, which has the potential to bias estimates of allocative inefficiency.
In this study, I develop a model that flexibly accounts for differences in the production
process across firms. I use the model to derive optimal input quantities for each firm and
compare them to observed quantities to obtain estimates of allocative inefficiency. Using
Bayesian model selection, I find that incorporating flexibility in production is appropriate
and necessary for obtaining unbiased estimates of allocative inefficiency. Next, I find that
firms generally overcapitalize in the rate-regulated rail industry, providing evidence of the
Averch-Johnson effect. Finally, I allow allocative errors to be correlated with variables
describing competitive pressures and find that greater market power is associated with less
allocative inefficiency, providing evidence against X-inefficiencies.
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Introduction
Beginning with the seminal work of Leibenstein (1966), researchers have recognized
that the inefficiency of firms can emanate from a lack of competitive pressure that
allows firms to depart from normal activities to reduce costs. There is an abundance
of research investigating firms’ inefficiency in production, which can arise both from
technical inefficiencies in the application of inputs and allocative inefficiencies where there
are errors in the optimal allocation of inputs. While technical inefficiencies emerge from
the production process, allocative inefficiencies are caused by mistakes in the decision-
making process of firms. There are many reasons why inefficiency in allocation exists, from
imperfect observation of factor prices to stickiness in the amounts of inputs used, or even
that firms may find reducing allocative errors more costly than the errors themselves.
In this paper I reexamine these issues by developing and estimating a model that
encompasses both forms of inefficiencies and also the effect of competition on inefficiency.
Unlike much of the previous research, I develop a model that describes production flexibly,
accounts for differences in the production technology across firms, and evaluates the role of
competitive pressures.
Allocative inefficiency has been studied extensively, but I introduce a model that
offers some important extensions. I remain agnostic of the exact causes of allocative
inefficiency, but I focus on measuring allocative errors and determining their relationship
with firm characteristics. First, existing models that estimate allocative inefficiency fail
to account for differences in the production process between firms. As noted by Tsionas
(2002), accounting for differences in production is necessary to obtain unbiased estimates
of technical inefficiency, but is presumably also crucial to estimate allocative inefficiency.
As an example, if some firm uses a given input more productively than another, then
it should use relatively more of that input to maximize profit. Thus, assuming that all
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firms share the production technology can lead to biases in estimates of allocative errors.
Additionally, I allow total factor productivity to follow a random-walk with drift, which
is a flexible form that is able to capture idiosyncratic shocks in productivity that could
otherwise lead to bias in estimates of inefficiency. Using this extended framework, I
can test whether allowing firm production to vary is appropriate using Bayesian model
selection. I also look for evidence of overcapitalization, which would support the Averch-
Johnson hypothesis that firms in rate-regulated industries over-invest in capital so that
total profit allowed by regulation is greater.
Finally, firms may face different incentives to reduce allocative inefficiencies. If some
firm is able to attract higher quality inputs, the cost of a mistake in allocation will be
higher, providing a greater incentive to minimize such errors. It is also possible that so
called “X-inefficiencies” contribute to allocative inefficiencies. As first noted in Leibenstein
(1966), firms with large market power may not face sufficient incentives to minimize costs
by, for example, reducing errors in the allocation of inputs. I introduce a model that
allows allocative inefficiencies to be correlated with competitive pressures to test for the
effects of input quality and X-inefficiencies on the allocation process.
I apply my model to the railroad industry. The industry is ideal for this analysis
because of its history of regulation and the geographically distinct nature of many firms.
First, partial deregulation of the industry dramatically reduced costs and improved
firm viability but also resulted in the consolidation of the industry into just seven firms,
causing concerns of excess market power. Second, there is little geographic overlap across
railroad networks, which only exacerbates the problem of market power but also means
firms can face different input supply markets and therefore different input quality. While
there has been research examining allocative inefficiency in the railroad industry (most
notably by Kumbhakar (1988)), I am not aware of any published research that has used a
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flexible form for the production function, allowed for variability in production across firms,
or investigated the relationship between allocation errors and firm characteristics.
I first find that controlling for differences in the production technology over firms is
appropriate, and failure to do so will result in biased estimates of allocative inefficiency.
Next, I find strong evidence of overcapitalization in the rail industry and no significant
evidence of undercapitalization. Since the industry is rate-regulated, this finding suggests
the Averch-Johnson effect may hold for railroads. Finally, I find that as measures of
market power increase, allocative errors decrease or don’t change at all. This finding
appears to refute the existence of X-inefficiencies in the rail industry since we would
expect to see allocative errors increase with an increase in market power if X-inefficiencies
were present.
I begin by reviewing the history of regulation, productivity, and inefficiency in the
railroad industry. I continue by reviewing the literature relevant to the estimation of
allocative inefficiency and its study in the railroad industry. I then develop my theoretical
model of production. The data sources are described, and empirical models are presented.
I then review and interpret results and follow with a conclusion.
Institutional Background
The railroad industry has faced some form of federal regulation since the passage
of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) of 1887. While there was significant competition
between railroads on a large scale before regulation, firms tended to operate more
as monopolies on a local scale (Brown, 2013). Railroads readily engaged in price
discrimination based on shipper’s access to competing modes and willingness to pay.
Firms would also often act as cartels, and many shippers were affected by excessive
rates (MacDonald and Cavalluzzo, 1996). The ICA established the Interstate Commerce
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Commission, which was granted the ability to set maximum rates, oversee mergers, and
ensure availability of services (Hilton, 1966). Regulation caused shippers to see more
reasonable rates and encouraged healthy competition in the industry (MacDonald and
Cavalluzzo, 1996).
The development and improvement of competing modes of transportation and
changes to the types of goods being shipped caused existing regulation to impede efficiency
as the 20th century progressed. Not only were new modes of transportation like truck
and air able to transport goods faster and serve more customers, but efficiency of barges
had improved and plastics, which are much less dense than other bulk materials, began to
constitute a greater part of all shipments (Wilson, 1994). As a result, railroad profits fell,
and many raised concerns over the inefficiency of regulation and working with a bloated
regulatory agency (Lahner, 1975). The industry was partially deregulated with the passage
of the 4R Act of 1976 and the Staggers Act of 1980. Deregulation granted firms much
more flexibility over the rates they set, allowed for contracts to be negotiated, granted
the regulatory agency less oversight over mergers, and allowed railroads to more easily
abandon lines (Johnson and Thomas, 1983).
Deregulation certainly resulted in efficiency improvements. First, since railroads
were operating many unprofitable routes and had significant excess capacity, there were
enormous gains to be realized in economies of density (Keeler, 1974). After deregulation,
railroads began abandoning lines to realize benefits of increased density, and the total
network controlled by Class I railroads fell from 164,822 miles in 1980 to just 95,391
miles in 2013 (United States Surface Transportation Board, 2015). The abolishment of
minimum rate regulation had a more humble effect; railroads were not able to use their
greater flexibility in pricing to attract as much traffic from competing modes as previously
thought, and the effect of rate deregulation on prices was negligible (Boyer, 1987).
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Railroads also aggressively pursued mergers and acquisitions following partial deregulation.
The number of Class I railroads fell from 40 in 1980 to 7 by 1999, where it remains today.
The merging of firms has two contradictory effects on efficiency. On the one hand, larger
firms are able to take advantage of economies of scale, which are prevalent in the railroad
industry. On the other hand, mergers reduce the level of competition in the market,
potentially putting upward pressure on prices and reducing the incentive to minimize
costs. However, between 1986 and 2001, consumer surplus rose by about 30% in U.S. rail
freight markets, indicating that the benefits of mergers appear to have outweighed the
cost, at least initially (Ivaldi and McCullough, 2005). Overall, cost savings amounted to
up to 40% by 1989, though they have leveled off more recently (Wilson, 1997).
The more recent effects of reduced competition on the railroad industry have been
less studied. While many have looked towards excessive rates and market power,1 few
have examined efficiency losses. As firms experience lower levels of competition, they
not only lose the incentive to keep prices low, but also have less incentive to minimize
costs (Leibenstein, 1966). Further, I am not aware of any published research that has
examined the effect of excess market power on errors in the allocation of inputs. While
precise allocation reduces production costs and may be important for competitive firms,
the allocation process is costly and railroads that face lower levels of competition may not
have the incentive to invest in accurate allocation.
Literature Review
The inefficiency of firms has been studied in a number of contexts. Inefficiency has
been separated into many components including technical and allocative, and various
methods have been used to empirically estimate these values. While the inefficiency
1For examples of studies that examine railroad pricing after deregulation, see Bitzan and Wilson
(2007), McFarland (1987), and MacDonald and Cavalluzzo (1996).
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of many industries has been studied, railroads have long been a focal point due to the
structure and importance of the industry and its history of regulation. In this section, I
first review the relevant literature surrounding the study of inefficiency, its various types,
and methods used for its estimation. I then cover studies of inefficiency in the railroad
industry, how they relate to regulation, and areas that have been less examined.
Sources of Inefficiency
Researchers have long been interested in measuring inefficiency, defined as the
realized deviation from maximum possible output. As the study of inefficiency grew, new
sources were discovered and quantified, ranging from technical inefficiencies in production
to suboptimal allocation of inputs to absence of incentives to minimize costs when there is
a lack of competition. While inefficiency has been discussed, measured, and studied using
a variety of methods, most current empirical work relies on stochastic frontier models. In
this section I review the study of inefficiency and its various sources and how it has been
empirically measured.
Aigner et al. (1977) began the empirical study of inefficiency with the introduction
of the stochastic frontier model. In contrast with traditional production models like
Solow (1957) that assume any empirical errors are driven by differences in productivity,
stochastic frontier models separate errors into differences in productivity, inefficiency, and
measurement error by invoking a structural assumption on inefficiency. Since it is defined
as deviation from maximum possible output, inefficiency inherently one-sided; that is,
inefficiency must be non-negative and cannot exceed 100%. By assuming it follows a one-
sided distribution such as log-normal or half-normal, it is possible to separately identify
inefficiency from the two-sided measurement error. By further imposing structure on
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productivity, specifically that it is constant across firms and time, the authors were able
to separately estimate productivity, inefficiency, and measurement error.
While standard stochastic frontier models can estimate inefficiency, they are not
able to assign a cause to it. There have been many extensions made to the stochastic
frontier model to ascertain these causes. Perhaps most notably, Schmidt and Lovell (1979)
introduces the concept of allocative inefficiency, which occurs when firms make errors
in the allocation of inputs. There could be several causes for these errors. On the one
hand, firms may not accurately observe prices, leading them to use a suboptimal bundle
of inputs; on the other hand, firms may also incorrectly predict needed input quantities or
may face rigidities that make selecting the optimal input allocation difficult or impossible.
The authors extend the standard stochastic frontier framework to model input demand
via the first-order condition for the firm’s profit maximization problem. By comparing
the optimal and actual input allocations, it is possible to find systematic over- or under-
allocation towards specific inputs and calculate the profit loss from this inefficiency.
Further, the underlying stochastic frontier model provides another measure of inefficiency,
which the authors call technical inefficiency, otherwise known as inefficiency in production.
The authors analyze privately-owned steam-electric generating plants and find evidence of
overuse of capital goods, providing evidence of the Averch-Johnson effect, where firms in
heavily regulated industries, especially those that focus on the price-to-capital ratio, will
tend to overcapitalize to increase profit potential.
Still other researchers have focused on precise causes of inefficiency. Oum and
Zhang (1995) examine the U.S. telephone industry and how the introduction of new
firms and competition affects allocative inefficiencies. The authors found that when a
new firm enters a market, the increased competition reduces incumbent firms’ over-
allocation towards capital inputs caused by the Averch-Johnson effect. Kumbhakar et al.
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(1991) investigates causes of both technical and allocative inefficiency in U.S. dairy farms
using a Cobb-Douglas production function. The authors relate inefficiency to various
characteristics of farms including their size and education of the owner. Higher levels of
education reduced both technical and allocative inefficiency, while larger farms had lower
technical inefficiency but similar allocative inefficiency compared to small- and medium-
sized farms.
In studying efficiency, it is also important to consider variation in the production
process across firms. Tsionas (2002) used a stochastic frontier framework with random
coefficients to study technical inefficiency. The author found that differences in production
were responsible for most of the apparent variation in inefficiency. When the author
assumed production was constant across firms, inefficiency was high and variable; when
the author allowed for variation in the production process, firms were found to be highly
efficient with far lower differences in efficiency across firms. While it certainly appears
important to consider variability in firm production, I am not aware of any research that
considers how those differences might bias estimates of allocative inefficiency.
Inefficiency of Railroads
The inefficiency of railroads has long been a focal point of research and has
driven discussion of the regulation and partial deregulation of the industry. Prior to
the partial deregulation of the industry, many worried that existing regulation impeded
efficiency. Railroads expressed concerns over their own viability in the current regulatory
environment and how efficiency was affected not only by firm’s limited ability to set rates,
merge with others, or abandon unprofitable routes but also by how cumbersome it was
to work with regulatory agencies (Lahner, 1975). Caves et al. (1981a) compared the
performance U.S. railroads with their less-regulated Canadian counterparts and found
104
that while U.S. railroads faced higher demand and generally better economic conditions,
Canadian firms experienced greater productivity growth, with excessive regulation being a
major cause. Had U.S. railroads grown at the same rate as their Canadian counterparts,
industry costs would have been up to 41% or $4 billion lower in 1974. Many believed that
specifically allowing railroads greater flexibility over rate setting would result in large
efficiency gains and improvements in viability by allowing them to more easily compete
with other modes of transportation, especially highway trucking (Harbeson, 1969).2
Still others found that deregulation would have a substantial effect on efficiency, but
not because of rate flexibility but rather the ability to merge and abandon unprofitable
lines (Boyer, 1987). Finally, others worried that deregulation would result in insufficient
competition in the industry, leading firms to have little incentive to either reduce prices or
minimize costs, potentially causing net social welfare losses (Johnson and Thomas, 1983).
Once the industry was partially deregulated in 1976 with the passage of the 4R Act
and in 1980 with the passage of the Staggers Act, the effects on the industry could be
more clearly seen. First, flexibility in rate setting appears to have improved the profits
and viability of firms but may result in welfare losses (Boyer, 1987). Levin (1981a) found
that in combination with other effects of deregulation, such as the ability to more easily
merge and abandon lines, competition would fall, especially considering the geographically
distinct nature of railroad networks. It was possible for regulators to promote competition
in the industry by, for example, more carefully scrutinizing parallel over end-to-end
mergers. However, more attention was paid to rate regulation which had the ability to
limit welfare losses from excessive rates, but did little to maintain competition and provide
an incentive to minimize costs (Levin, 1981b). Surprisingly, mergers had little overall
2For more reading on the idea that rate regulation was the greatest source of inefficiency among
railroads, see Meyer et al. (1959), Friedlaender (1969), and Moore (1975).
105
effect on efficiency, indicating that gains earned from exercising economies of scale and
scope may have been lost to the lack of competition (Chapin and Schmidt, 1999).
Few have examined the allocative inefficiency of railroads, especially recently.
Notably, Kumbhakar (1988) measures the allocative errors in the industry prior
to deregulation and found that between 1951 and 1975, allocative inefficiency rose
dramatically for the industry as a whole, from 12.03% to 20.4% of costs, clearly indicating
the need for deregulation of the industry. While many have examined the effects of falling
competitive forces on prices, especially on a local level3, I am not aware of any published
research that examines the recent inefficiency of railroads (either technical or allocative)
and how they relate to competitive pressures and input quality.
Conceptual Framework
I begin by assuming production is Hicks-neutral with an inefficiency component:
Qit = AitFi(Xit; Φit)∆it. (4.1)
In this equation, Qit is the output of firm i in year t, Ait represents firm i’s total factor
productivity in year t, Fi is a transformation function that is constant across time but
specific to firm i, Xit measures inputs, Φit measures firm and network characteristics, and
∆it is a number between zero and one that quantifies efficiency. It is important to include
inefficiency into the specification of the production function to draw a distinction between
a firm’s production potential and its actual level of output (Aigner et al., 1977). In order
to maintain minimal assumptions about the shape of the production function, I opt to
3For more reading, see Bitzan and Wilson (2007), McFarland (1987), MacDonald and Cavalluzzo
(1996), and Burton and Wilson (2006).
106
approximate it using a first-order log Taylor approximation:
qit ≈ αit − δit +
∑
j
∂ lnFi
∂ lnXj
xjit +
∑
j
∂ lnFi
∂ ln Φj
ϕjit. (4.2)
Lower-case variables are log-transformed versions of upper case variables, and superscripts
index vectors of variables. As an exception, ∆it = exp(−δit), and the inefficiency term
δit is restricted to be positive to ensure that the efficiency term ∆it is between zero and
one. Letting partial derivatives with respect to inputs be called βi and those with respect
to network characteristics be called θi, Equation (4.2) can then be rewritten in log-linear
form as
qit ≈ αit − δit +
∑
j
βji x
j
it +
∑
j
θjiϕ
j
it. (4.3)
Finally, I gather inputs xjit into xit and characteristics θ
j
i into θi and label errors accrued in
approximation and measurement εit, so log production can be expressed exactly as
qit = αit − δit + xitβi + ϕitθi + εit. (4.4)
As is, equation (4.4) assumes exact cost minimization, and as a result, the
inefficiency term δ in only captures technical inefficiencies that are the result of “an
equiproportianate overutilization of all inputs” (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979). Since this
research is also concerned with allocative inefficiencies that result from using suboptimal
proportions of inputs, I also model the firm’s choice of inputs to separate technical from
allocative inefficiency. Assuming firms are price-takers, profit can be written as
pi(Xit) = PitQit −
∑
j
W jitX
j
it, (4.5)
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where Pit is the price firm i receives for its output in year t, W
j
it is the price of input j for
firm i in year t, and output Qit depends on inputs Xit. The first-order condition for profit
maximization4 with respect to input k is given by
∂pi
∂Xkit
= Pit
∂Qit
∂Xkit
−W kit = 0, (4.6)
which implies that
∂Qit
∂Xkit
=
W kit
Pit
. (4.7)
Now, since Qit had a Cobb-Douglas form, this condition has a closed-form solution. First
notice that
∂Qit
∂Xkit
Xkit
Qit
=
∂ lnQit
∂ lnXkit
= βki . (4.8)
Thus, using the condition from equation (4.6),
W kit
Pit
=
∂Qit
∂Xkit
= βki
Qit
Xkit
. (4.9)
Rewritten,
Xkit = β
k
i
PitQit
W kit
. (4.10)
Then, denoting the capital input X1it, the optimal ratio of capital to input k is
X1it
Xkit
=
β1iW
k
it
βkiW
1
it
, (4.11)
or in logarithms,
x1it − xkit = log
Ç
β1i
βki
å
− log
Ç
W 1it
W kit
å
. (4.12)
4I assume production is concave so that there is a solution to the firm’s problem, and I assume firms
use positive amounts of each input, which is verified empirically.
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Now, I assume that firms experience allocative inefficiency, i.e., deviation from optimal
input use. I measure these deviations with errors ηkit so that the observed ratio of capital
to input k is
x1it − xkit = log
Ç
β1i
βki
å
− log
Ç
W 1it
W kit
å
+ ηkit. (4.13)
I also assume that there are systematic allocative errors, so that ηkit ∼ N(µki , σki ). Here, µki
represents the average amount firm i overcapitalizes relative to input k.
Data
To conduct my analysis, I use data from R1 financial forms filed with the United
States Surface Transportation Board (STB). These forms are filed annually by each Class
I railroad and describe financial and operating statistics. The data cover the time period
from 1999 to 2014. This period was chosen because all Class I mergers occurred before
1999 and railroad operations have been relatively stable since, providing a sample over
which differences in productions technologies across firms can be more easily identified.
The Class I railroads in this sample are Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), the
Canadian National Railway (CN), CSX Transportation (CSX), the Kansas City Southern
Railway (KCS), the Norfolk Southern Railway (NS), the Soo Line Railroad (SOO)5, and
the Union Pacific Railroad (UP). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.1.
The dependent variable in my analysis is aggregate revenue-ton-miles, defined as one
ton of product which generates railroad revenue that is shipped one mile. I describe the
output of revenue-ton-miles with input use and characteristics of the railroad’s network.
There are many inputs described in the R1 forms, and I use total numbers of cars and
locomotives, total number of hours worked, amount of fuel consumed, and the book
5While Canadian Pacific Railway has owned the Soo Line Railroad since 1990, Soo changed in name to
Canadian Pacific in the early 2000s; I will continue to refer to this railroad as SOO.
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value of capital. I also control for several characteristics that differentiate production
across firms. First, I include the traffic mix for each railroad, which includes both the
types of goods being shipped and the different types of shipments that railroads provide
(Tretheway et al., 1997). Empirically, I include the percentage of shipments that contain
bulk goods6 and the percentage of shipments that are on unit trains. I also control for
the size of railroad networks, empirically represented by miles of road, defined as the
total length of non-redundant track controlled by a firm. As noted by Bitzan and Wilson
(2007), shipment distance is an important factor in production, so I control for the average
length of haul. Finally, the quality of track may have an important effect on efficiency and
maintenance costs. As discussed in Wilson (1997), average train speed should be positively
correlated with track quality, so I also include it as a network characteristic.
In order to determine optimal input quantities, I use factor prices for each input.
These prices are easy to calculate for labor and fuel because the R1 forms contain total
costs and quantities for those factors. However, the economic cost of cars, locomotives,
and track are not directly available. I infer that the opportunity cost of a capital input j is
Annual Depreciationj + ROIj
Xj
,
where Xj is the amount of input j used, ROIj = (Investmentj−Accumulated Depreciationj)×
CostK , and CostK is the cost of capital. The R1 forms contain information on investment,
depreciation, and input quantities, and I use the Rail Cost Adjustment Factor (RCAF)
published by the American Association of Railroads as the cost of capital. Finally, I use
average output price, defined as total revenue divided by revenue-ton-miles, as my measure
6I define bulk products as belonging to one of the following categories: Metallic ores, nonmetallic
minerals (not fuels), waste/scrap metals, clay/concrete/glass/stone, farm products.
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of price. All nominal variables have been deflated using the GDP price deflator published
by FRED with 2009 as the base year.
Empirical Models
Common Technology
From Section 4, recall that output is expressed as
qit = αit − δit + xitβi + ϕitθi + εit. (4.14)
First, it is not possible to separately identify αit, δit, and εit without assuming additional
structure. I first assume that inefficiency is constant across time, so that δit = δi for all
t. Additionally, I use the assumption that inefficiency is one-sided (specifically that δi ∼
N+(0, σδ)) to identify δi. I also assume that network characteristics affect firms in the
same way, so that θi = θ. For the moment, I also assume firms share the same production
process, so βi = β. Finally, to flexibly capture changes in productivity over time, I assume
it follows a random-walk with drift.7 Specifically, I assume that
αit = αit−1 + τi + νit, (4.15)
where τi is the trend in firm i’s productivity and νit is a normally distributed error term.
With these assumptions, the production function becomes
qit = αit − δi + xitβ + ϕitθ + εit. (4.16)
7For more examples of the various uses of time-varying-parameter models, see Leybourne (1993),
Mazzocchi (2003), and Del Negro and Otrok (2008).
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I assume that νit ∼ iid N(0, σν), δi ∼ iid N+(0, σδ), and εit ∼ iid N(0, σε). For details on
prior assumptions over the parameters, see the Appendix.
Next, recall that firm i’s overcapitalization relative to input k in year t is given by
x1it − xkit = log
Ç
β1
βk
å
− log
Ç
W 1it
W kit
å
+ ηkit. (4.17)
Once again, I assume that ηkit ∼ N(µη, ση), which captures systematic allocative
inefficiencies.
Estimation of this model is similar to that of traditional stochastic frontier
models. I use a Bayesian estimation framework to both mitigate problems of parameter
instability and to properly express parameter uncertainty, both of which are issues that
commonly appear when classical methods are used to estimate these types of models (van
Den Broeck et al., 1994; Koop et al., 1995). Since the model includes equations describing
both output and input decisions, estimation is conducted in stages. First, parameters in
the output equation (including β) are drawn using Gibbs sampling. Then, conditional
on a value for β, allocative errors can be computed and parameters describing mean and
variance of allocative errors can be drawn via Gibbs sampling.
Of course, firms transform inputs to output differently from each other, and those
differences can influence how allocative inefficiency is estimated. To investigate the impact
of these differences, I turn to my second empirical model.
Variation in Production
Variability in the production process can clearly have an effect on estimates of
allocative inefficiency. As an example, if one firm has an appreciably higher productivity
of capital, it will optimally use less capital than other firms. Under the assumption
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of uniform production, this difference in productivity manifests as a bias towards
overcapitalization.8 To capture differences in production processes across firms and control
for its effect on estimates of allocative inefficiency, I assume that βi can vary by firm. This
makes the output and inefficiency equations
qit = αit − δi + xitβi + ϕitθ + εit (4.18)
x1it − xkit = log
Ç
β1i
βki
å
− log
Ç
W 1it
W kit
å
+ ηkit. (4.19)
To separately identify each βi, I assume they come from a common distribution;
specifically, I assume that
βi ∼ N(µβ,Σβ). (4.20)
Estimation is again carried out in a Bayesian framework and follows two stages. The
first draws samples of parameters in the output equation through Gibbs sampling, and
the second draws values of parameters related to allocative inefficiency, also via Gibbs
sampling. For more detail on the sampler and prior assumptions over the parameters, see
the Appendix.
While this model describes the inefficiency of firms, it doesn’t attribute any cause
to those inefficiencies. To investigate the effect of firm characteristics on misallocation of
inputs, I turn to my final model.
Relating Misallocation and Firm Characteristics
In this model, I draw connections between allocative errors and firm characteristics,
especially those related to competition and input quality. That is, rather than simply
8This can also be seen in equation (4.13); if firm i’s β1 increases, allocative inefficiency ηki must be
decrease to maintain the equality.
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estimating the amount of allocative inefficiency as in equation (4.17), I assume that
x1it − xkit = log
Ç
β1i
βki
å
− log
Ç
W 1it
W kit
å
+ Citγk + η
k
it. (4.21)
where Cit describes competitive pressures felt by firm i in year t and η
k
it is a normally
distributed empirical error. Thus, γk captures the effect of competitive pressures on the
allocative error in input k. If X-inefficiencies are present and variables Cit positively
measure competition, we would expect those variables to increase the magnitude of
misallocation. If the industry is generally overcapitalized so that x1it − xkit > 0, then we
would expect coefficients γk to be positive if X-inefficiencies exist.
I maintain the other assumptions of the model, and as a result, estimation follows
a similar process. Conditional on having prior assumptions over the parameters of this
model, sampling follows a two stage process where parameters can be drawn via Gibbs
sampling.
Results
This section presents and discusses results of the three empirical models discussed in
the previous section. While specific results will be discussed in the proceeding subsections,
parameter estimates and estimates of allocative inefficiency for each of the models can be
found in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Further, estimates of returns to scale, which is equal
to the sum of input elasticities, are given in Table 4. Recall that I use Bayesian methods
to estimate these models, which yields a probability distribution for each parameter
conditional on the data and prior assumptions over the parameters. The estimates
presented in the following section are the means of the distributions, and estimates in
parentheses represent standard deviations.
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TABLE 15. Parameter Estimates
Common Random Competitive
Production Production Variables
Technical inefficiency
BNSF 0.279 0.317 0.338
(0.348) (0.412) (0.469)
CN 0.305 0.324 0.3
(0.464) (0.411) (0.416)
CSX 0.293 0.34 0.324
(0.417) (0.457) (0.46)
KCS 0.296 0.325 0.304
(0.363) (0.491) (0.387)
NS 0.299 0.351 0.315
(0.38) (0.518) (0.402)
SOO 0.308 0.326 0.312
(0.432) (0.448) (0.43)
UP 0.303 0.34 0.32
(0.437) (0.509) (0.434)
Input productivities
Capital 0.17 0.195 0.13
(0.053) (0.083) (0.024)
Cars 0.09 0.151 0.157
(0.073) (0.076) (0.099)
Locomotives 0.372 0.464 0.484
(0.075) (0.231) (0.165)
Fuel 0.346 0.236 0.257
(0.106) (0.098) (0.032)
Labor 0.051 0.085 0.097
(0.042) (0.042) (0.032)
Network characteristics
Average length of haul 0.538 0.532 0.506
(0.122) (0.113) (0.116)
Miles of road -0.277 -0.271 -0.276
(0.126) (0.131) (0.123)
Percent unit 0.049 0.049 0.032
(0.049) (0.042) (0.044)
Percent bulk -0.07 -0.047 -0.082
(0.079) (0.076) (0.076)
N 112 112 112
Model probability 0.2911 0.51947 0.18943
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TABLE 16. Allocative Inefficiency Relative to Capital
Common Random Competitive Common Random Competitive
Production Production Variables Production Production Variables
BNSF NS
Cars 2.016 2.498 2.541 Cars 0.673 0.173 0.862
(1.134) (1.026) (0.983) (0.496) (0.794) (0.683)
Locomotives 1.473 2.665 2.522 Locomotives 0.891 0.282 0.952
(1.134) (0.994) (0.902) (0.491) (0.783) (0.7)
Fuel 0.965 1.686 2.537 Fuel 0.945 0.536 0.88
(1.139) (1.102) (0.951) (0.498) (0.725) (0.683)
Labor 1.972 2.472 2.521 Labor 0.617 -0.19 0.951
(1.143) (0.99) (0.906) (0.497) (0.837) (0.7)
CN SOO
Cars 0.965 1.79 2.534 Cars 0.937 0.081 0.854
(1.138) (0.886) (0.928) (0.489) (0.793) (0.684)
Locomotives 0.724 1.009 2.521 Locomotives 0.414 0.722 1.22
(1.162) (0.929) (0.906) (1.025) (1.233) (1.031)
Fuel 1.947 2.233 2.539 Fuel 1.619 2.289 2.089
(1.14) (0.954) (0.963) (1.024) (1.056) (1.039)
Labor 1.439 1.517 2.315 Labor 0.169 0.801 1.392
(0.472) (0.663) (0.591) (1.021) (0.965) (1.026)
CSX UP
Cars 2.497 1.902 2.378 Cars 1.041 1.558 2.18
(0.459) (0.963) (0.588) (1.023) (0.997) (1.045)
Locomotives 1.735 2.129 2.327 Locomotives 0.215 0.907 1.552
(0.445) (0.585) (0.579) (1.022) (0.998) (1.024)
Fuel 1.708 1.539 2.385 Fuel 0.685 0.823 2.177
(0.463) (0.619) (0.596) (1.028) (1.086) (1.044)
Labor 1.839 2.417 2.339 Labor 0.351 0.677 1.327
(0.454) (0.569) (0.572) (1.023) (1.014) (1.027)
KCS
Cars 1.548 1.431 2.385
(0.459) (0.626) (0.595)
Locomotives 1.584 1.75 2.322
(0.456) (0.592) (0.583)
Fuel 0.911 0.157 0.842
(0.489) (0.836) (0.686)
Labor 1.202 1.255 0.941
(0.498) (0.861) (0.696)
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TABLE 17. Returns to Scale
Common Random Competitive
Production Production Variables
BNSF 1.03 1.158 1.192
(0.118) (0.185) (0.141)
CN 1.03 0.873 0.872
(0.118) (0.171) (0.141)
CSX 1.03 1.242 1.199
(0.118) (0.191) (0.164)
KCS 1.03 1.083 1.066
(0.118) (0.184) (0.143)
NS 1.03 1.263 1.243
(0.118) (0.178) (0.164)
SOO 1.03 1.076 1.176
(0.118) (0.153) (0.153)
UP 1.03 1.192 1.177
(0.118) (0.169) (0.142)
Common Technology
Parameter estimates for this model are given in the “Common Production” column
of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Technical inefficiency, which reflects inefficiencies in
transforming inputs into outputs, ranges between 0.279 and 0.308, with BNSF having the
greatest technical efficiency. Specifically, these estimates indicate that BNSF produced
exp(−0.279) ≈ 75.7% of what it could have if it used inputs to their maximum efficiency.
Input productivities refer to the elasticity of output with respect to input variables, i.e.,
the percentage increase in output that results from a 1% increase in the use of a given
input. Estimates relating to network characteristics are also elasticities.
Estimates of allocative inefficiency are presented as overcapitalization (i.e.,
investment in capital beyond what is profit-maximizing) with respect to each input and
for each firm in Table 3. Estimates indicate that railroads systematically over-invest
in capital relative to what is profit-maximizing. This finding provides evidence for the
Averch-Johnson hypothesis, which predicts that firms in industries where regulators
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TABLE 18. Pairwise Allocative Inefficiency
Capital Cars Locomotives Fuel Labor
Capital -1.438 -1.764 -0.883 -0.642
(1.25) (0.561) (0.525) (1.133)
Cars 1.438 -0.327 0.555 0.795
(1.25) (1.878) (1.84) (2.848)
Locomotives 1.764 0.327 0.882 1.122
(0.561) (1.878) (0.59) (1.599)
Fuel 0.883 -0.555 -0.882 0.24
(0.525) (1.84) (0.59) (1.56)
Labor 0.642 -0.795 -1.122 -0.24
(1.133) (2.848) (1.599) (1.56)
restrict revenue-to-cost ratios tend to overcapitalize to increase costs, thereby increasing
the total profit potential.
It can also be useful to consider the overutilization of any input j to any other
input k. This information is given in Table 5; the ijth entry in Table 5 measures the
overutilization of input j with respect to input i on average over all firms.9 First, as noted
previously, firms tend to overcapitalize, and the excess is largest on average relative to
quantities of cars and locomotives. Labor is overutilized on average with respect to every
input except capital, with rates between 0.24 and 1.122, potentially providing evidence of
union effects.
Since production (and therefore input elasticities) are assumed to be shared by
firms in this model, estimates of returns to scale do not vary by firm. I find that estimate
the mean of returns to scale is 1.03, indicating that a 1% increase in all inputs will
increase output by 1.03% on average. Returns to scale near unity indicates that firms are
near minimum efficient scale; that is, those firms operate where their average costs are
minimized.
9It is important to note that these estimates are averaged over all firms, and that a specific firm might
experience misallocation even when the industry doesn’t on average.
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Variability in Production
As mentioned in previous sections, estimates of allocative inefficiency will be biased
inasmuch as the productivity of inputs varies across firms. This model investigates the
relevancy of incorporating differences in production between firms and how that affects
estimates of allocative errors.
First, I use Bayesian model selection to determine the importance of allowing the
production technology to vary across firms. In a Bayesian framework, model selection
considers a set of models, of which one is assumed to be correct, and attributes to each
model the probability of being the correct model. The probability that a model Mk is the
correct model conditional on the data D is given by
Pr(Mk|D) = Pr(D|Mk) Pr(Mk)
Pr(D)
=
Pr(D|Mk) Pr(Mk)∑
j Pr(D|Mj) Pr(Mj) , (4.22)
where Pr(D|Mk) is the marginal likelihood of the data in model Mk and Pr(Mk) is the
prior probability attributed to Mk. In general, it can be difficult to compute the marginal
likelihood, but given I use a Gibbs sampler for my estimation, I use the methods in Chib
and Jeliazkov (2001) for efficient calculation of model probabilities. Model probabilities are
given in the second to last column of Table 2.
The only difference between this model and the Common Technology model is
flexibility in describing firms’ production processes. I find that the model which allows
production to vary over firms is approximately 1.785 times more likely to be correct
than the model which assumes input productivities are constant over firms. This clearly
indicates that it is necessary to incorporate differences in the production process of firms
when modeling allocative inefficiency in rail markets.
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The bias that results from restrictive assumptions on firm production is clear when
comparing results between the common and variable production models. To more clearly
see these effects, I have included estimates of input productivities for each firm in Table
6, which can be compared to allocative inefficiency in the “Random Production” column
of Table 3. There are many cases to draw from, but as an example, the productivity of
fuel is higher for CN (0.304) than for any other firm (between 0.203 and 0.243). In the
model that assumed a common production technology, CN was assumed to have the same
productivity with respect to locomotives as other firms, resulting in a modest estimate
of overcapitalization with respect to locomotives. Intuitively, after accounting for the
difference in production, we should infer that since CN has high fuel productivity, it
should use even more fuel than we previously estimated, resulting in a higher estimate
of overcapitalization. Indeed, after accounting for variation in production processes, the
estimate of CN’s overcapitalization with respect to fuel increases from 1.947 to 2.233,
indicative of the bias present in the common technology model.
TABLE 19. Input Productivity Estimates
BNSF CN CSX KCS NS SOO UP
Capital 0.215 0.14 0.177 0.206 0.161 0.223 0.226
(0.215) (0.223) (0.149) (0.179) (0.552) (0.233) (0.093)
Cars 0.149 0.18 0.162 0.149 0.157 0.127 0.126
(0.14) (0.226) (0.157) (0.571) (0.215) (0.218) (0.097)
Locomotives 0.498 0.179 0.571 0.388 0.62 0.434 0.552
(0.177) (0.149) (0.127) (0.388) (0.304) (0.203) (0.091)
Fuel 0.215 0.304 0.239 0.243 0.233 0.218 0.203
(0.206) (0.18) (0.126) (0.62) (0.239) (0.082) (0.074)
Labor 0.082 0.07 0.093 0.097 0.091 0.074 0.085
(0.161) (0.162) (0.498) (0.434) (0.243) (0.07) (0.085)
While specific estimates, especially those relating to allocative inefficiency, have
changed from the previous model, general takeaways remain the same. Estimates of
parameters and allocative errors can be found in the “Random Production” column of
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Tables 2 and 3, respectively, and a pairwise comparison of allocative inefficiencies across
inputs is given in Table 7. Firms are generally overcapitalizing with inefficiencies highest
with respect to cars and locomotives, again providing evidence of the Averch-Johnson
effect. Further, firms tend underutilize cars and overutilize fuel with respect to every input
apart from capital. Firms also use more labor than what is profit-maximizing relative to
both cars and locomotives, possibly indicative of persistent rigidities in labor allocation
due to labor unions. As in the previous model, average industry overcapitalization with
respect to fuel and labor is not significantly different from zero, but there is significant
overcapitalization on average with respect to both cars and locomotives.
TABLE 20. Pairwise Allocative Inefficiency
Capital Cars Locomotives Fuel Labor
Capital -2.05 -1.812 -0.328 -1.111
(1.125) (0.75) (0.912) (1.19)
Cars 2.05 0.238 1.723 0.94
(1.125) (1.829) (2.098) (2.682)
Locomotives 1.812 -0.238 1.484 0.701
(0.75) (1.829) (1.395) (1.979)
Fuel 0.328 -1.723 -1.484 -0.783
(0.912) (2.098) (1.395) (2.248)
Labor 1.111 -0.94 -0.701 0.783
(1.19) (2.682) (1.979) (2.248)
Estimates of returns to scale vary across firms in this model since each firm is
permitted to have a different production technology. Still, returns to scale are near unity,
indicating production near minimum efficient scale. I find that CN has the lowest returns
to scale at 0.873, meaning it experiences increasing average costs, while the remainder of
the firms have returns to scale slightly above one, allowing them to experience increasing
returns to scale.
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Relating Misallocation and Firm Characteristics
The final empirical model relates firm characteristics to allocative errors. Since
the structure of this model remains otherwise unchanged from the previous model, we
would expect estimates of parameters and returns to scale to be similar. As seen in the
“Competitive Variables” column in Tables 2 and 4, all estimates not related to allocative
inefficiency change little from the previous model. Further, as seen in average allocative
inefficiency in Table 8, firms still tend to overcapitalize, with the excess being greatest
on average relative to cars, yet again providing evidence supporting the Averch-Johnson
hypothesis.
TABLE 21. Pairwise Allocative Inefficiency
Capital Cars Locomotives Fuel Labor
Capital -2.518 -2.392 -0.963 -2.281
(0.913) (0.606) (0.706) (1.052)
Cars 2.518 0.126 1.555 0.237
(0.913) (1.2) (1.331) (1.939)
Locomotives 2.392 -0.126 1.429 0.111
(0.606) (1.2) (0.865) (1.473)
Fuel 0.963 -1.555 -1.429 -1.318
(0.706) (1.331) (0.865) (1.604)
Labor 2.281 -0.237 -0.111 1.318
(1.052) (1.939) (1.473) (1.604)
I allow allocative errors for each input to be correlated with the Herfindahl index,
a measure of market share, to test for the existence of potential X-inefficiencies. The
intuition is larger firms that face less competition may not have sufficient incentives to
minimize costs. This effect could be further amplified by the Averch-Johnson effect in
rate-regulated industries because by increasing costs, those firms could realize greater total
profits. The relationship between the Herfindahl index and allocative inefficiency is shown
in Table 9. The Herfindahl index does not have a significant effect on overcapitalization
with respect to any variable except labor, for which it reduces overcapitalization. An
123
increase in a firm’s market share only increases overcapitalization on average relative
to cars, but this effect is insignificant. Overall, these findings do not lend evidence to
the X-inefficiency hypothesis; in fact, I find that larger firms tend to have lower levels of
misallocation.
TABLE 22. Effects of Firm Characteristics on Allocative Errors
Cars Locomotives Fuel Labor
Herfindahl 0.043 -0.148 -0.23 -2.016
(1.044) (0.683) (0.469) (0.686)
Conclusion
The inefficiency of firms has been dissected and studied in many ways and in
many contexts. Fundamentally, inefficiencies may occur despite firms’ best efforts, as
in the case of imperfect observation of prices, or because of incentives firms face due
to regulation or the state of competition, as in the case of Averch-Johnson effects and
X-inefficiencies. First, to analyze sources of inefficiency, it is crucial that the empirical
framework can provide consistent estimates of inefficiency. Previous research shown the
importance of controlling for differences in production over firms in obtaining unbiased
estimates of technical inefficiency, but no published research has examined its effect on
estimating errors in allocation. I develop models that allow production to vary flexibly
over firms and estimate both technical and allocative inefficiency. I use these models
to test whether incorporating flexibility in production across firms is appropriate and
important in obtaining unbiased estimates of allocative errors. I go on to look for evidence
of overcapitalization and Averch-Johnson effects as well as whether increased market
power increases inefficiency, which could provide evidence for X-inefficiencies.
I first examine whether it is appropriate and even necessary to control for differences
in production over firms when estimating allocative inefficiency. Using Bayesian model
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selection, I compare two models, one where the production technology is shared among
firms and one where it is allowed to vary, and I find the model with differences in
production better describes the data and is far more likely to be the correct model.
Further, estimates of allocative inefficiency are clearly and evidently biased when it
is assumed firms share the production technology. Thus, it is not only appropriate to
incorporate flexibility in production, but it is also crucial to obtaining unbiased estimates
of allocative errors.
I also look for evidence of the Averch-Johnson effect, which states that firms in
rate-regulated industries tend to over-invest in capital to increase total profit allowed by
regulators. I find no evidence of firms undercapitalizing with respect to any other input
and in most cases find significant evidence of overcapitalization. This finding is present in
each of my three models, providing strong evidence that firms over-invest in capital in the
rate-regulated rail industry, as predicted by the Averch-Johnson hypothesis.
Finally, I look for evidence of X-inefficiencies, which can arise if a firm does not have
sufficient incentives to minimize their costs. To test this hypothesis, I allow allocative
inefficiencies to be correlated with the Herfindahl index, a measure of a firm’s market
power. I find that allocative errors decrease or don’t change at all as market power
increases. This finding appears to refute the existence of X-inefficiencies in the rail
industry.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Considering its long history of regulation and its critical role in transportation, the
railroad industry provides an interesting context to study efficiency, productivity, and
competition and how each are affected by regulation. In these essays, I examine railroads
after the partial deregulation of the industry and investigate recent progress in efficiency
as well as potential negative effects that result from decreases in competition between
firms.
I first analyze markups and scale elasticities in the industry and find that prices are
significantly greater than marginal costs and that production is generally near minimum
efficient scale. I then examine productivity changes in the industry and separate them
into those caused by innovation and those caused by other factors such as mergers or
the abandonment of unprofitable lines. I find that most firms have not seen productivity
increases since 1999, and the sources of productivity growth vary depending on the ability
of firms to pursue actions like line abandonment. My final chapter investigates errors in
the allocation of inputs, methods of obtaining unbiased estimates of those errors, and
how they are related to competitive pressures, with the understanding that competition
provides the incentive for firms to both keep prices low as well as minimize costs. I find
that incorporating flexibility into production across firms is vital for securing consistent
estimates of allocative inefficiency and that increased market share actually decreases
allocative errors, providing evidence against the X-inefficiency hypothesis in the rail
industry.
These studies provide a descriptive and granular insight into key functionings of the
railroads. As the industry continues to grow and serve as a part of our nation’s critical
transportation infrastructure, concern of issues regarding pricing, productivity, and
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efficiency will persist, especially in light of how the industry continues to be regulated.
Further, this research expounds on how the industry has progressed since its last
consolidation in 1999. While it appears that markups remain in excess of marginal costs
and there is evidence of significant overcapitalization in the rail industry, firms have
seen growth in productivity, turning towards technological change when other channels
of increasing productivity have been exhausted, and increased market power does not
appear to increase errors in allocation. While the prospects for the continued operation
and success of railroads looks optimistic, attention to consumer outcomes and regulation’s
role in assuring those outcomes will be needed.
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APPENDIX A
MARKUPS AND SCALE ELASTICITIES FOR DIFFERENTIATED RAIL
NETWORKS
Bayesian Flexible Trend Model
This section presents the Flexible Trend version of the Bayesian model in its entirety.
First, the data in this model are the measure of output q̂it, capital input use x̂
K
it , variable
input use x̂Vit , network characteristics ϕit, and instruments Zit. The instrumental variables
approach to estimating this model has two stages; in the first stage I use instruments and
exogenous variables to predict the endogenous variables x̂Vit and x̂
K
it :
x̂Vit ∼ N
Ä
F Vi + ZitαV + ϕitβV , σ
2
V
ä
for each i, t
x̂Kit ∼ N
Ä
FKi + ZitαK + ϕitβK , σ
2
K
ä
for each i, t.
Here, Fi represents firm fixed effects, α and β are parameter vectors, and σ
2 is the
measure of uncertainty in these regressions. I then construct the fitted values from this
first stage, which are given by
x˜Vit = F
V
i + ZitαV + ϕitβV
x˜Kit = F
K
i + ZitαK + ϕitβK .
The second stage of the model is then given by
q̂it ∼ N
Ä
Fi + µitx˜
V
it + ηitx˜
K
it + ϕitβ, σ
2
ä
.
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Now, to obtain the posterior density of µit and ηit, there needs to be some assumption on
the distributions from which those parameters are drawn. Specifically, I assume that
[µ1t − 1, ..., µFt − 1, η1t, ..., ηFt]′ ∼ lnMVN ([µt, ..., µt, ηt, ..., ηt]′,Σ2F ) ,
where Σ2F is a covariance matrix and [µt, ηt]
′ is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed each year as
 µt
ηt
 ∼MVN
Ü $1
$2
 ,χ
ê
,
where $1 and $2 are hyperparameters and χ is a 2 by 2 covariance matrix. This
concludes the likelihood and random parameter portion of the model, and prior
distributions for each parameter are given below. This priors are intended to be diffuse
in order to limit the effect of prior assumptions on posterior results.
F Vi , F
K
i , Fi, αV , αK , βV , βK , β ∼ iid N(0, 25)
σV , σK , σ ∼ iid Gamma(0.5, 0.5)
[$1, $2]
′ ∼MVN ([0, 0]′, I2)
χ−1 ∼Wishart(I2, 2)
Σ−12F ∼Wishart(I2F , 2F )
Bayesian Linear Trend Model and Results
Rather than allowing µt and ηt to drift flexibly across time as in the Flexible Trend
model, the Linear Trend version of the Bayesian model assumes that µt = µ + δµt and
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ηt = η + δηt, where δµ and δη are drift parameters. Thus, each µit will have a mode of
(exp(δµ))
t exp(µ) + 1 and each ηit will have a mode of (exp(δη))
t exp(η). My priors for
these parameters are
δµ, δη ∼ N(0, 1)
[µ, η]′ ∼MVN ([0, 0]′, I2) .
All other assumptions and priors remain the same as in the Flexible Trend model.
I present results analogous to those given for the Flexible Trend version of this
model. Markup and scale elasticity means and quantiles are given for each firm in Table
8. Results from the Linear Trend model are very similar to those from the Flexible Trend
model; however, 2012 markup estimates tend to be higher and 2012 scale estimates tend
to be lower in the Linear Trend model. Additionally, elasticities of network characteristics
are similar to previous results as well. Finally, given that mean and median estimates of
exp(δµ) and exp(δη) are greater than one, I observe some evidence that markups and scale
elasticities have been drifting upward over the course of the sample at a rate of 4% per
year for markups and 0.8% per year for scales.
I additionally present densities for markups and scales for each firm in 2012 in Figure
5 and median markup and scale estimates for each year in Figure 6. Markup and scale
estimates show similar patterns over time in both the Linear and Flexible Trend models;
for example, BNSF experienced a sustained increase in its scale elasticity that began in
2007, as observed in the Flexible Trend model. There is also a clearly identifiable upward
trend in markups and some positive trend in scales in this model. Given that I don’t
expect markups and scales to strictly adhere to a trend, I prefer the Flexible model to
the Linear Trend model; however, the similarity of results between these models provides
evidence for the robustness of these models.
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FIGURE 22. Markups and Scales Over Time
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TABLE 23. Trend Model Estimation
Quantiles:
Mean 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
2012 Markups
BNSF 1.529 1.168 1.32 1.456 1.636 2.134
CN 1.517 1.211 1.345 1.457 1.638 2.045
CSX 1.542 1.194 1.329 1.469 1.651 2.159
KCS 1.596 1.177 1.35 1.528 1.772 2.256
NS 1.646 1.184 1.36 1.573 1.862 2.31
SOO 1.627 1.218 1.377 1.535 1.739 2.372
UP 1.591 1.201 1.331 1.465 1.746 2.377
2012 Scales
BNSF 1.043 0.804 0.927 1.074 1.159 1.225
CN 0.736 0.532 0.655 0.752 0.82 0.891
CSX 1.051 0.39 0.705 0.985 1.317 1.913
KCS 0.85 0.657 0.801 0.856 0.893 1.005
NS 0.9 0.515 0.713 0.854 1.061 1.456
SOO 0.899 0.627 0.822 0.947 0.996 1.044
UP 0.769 0.534 0.697 0.789 0.851 0.931
exp(δµ) 1.04 0.907 0.97 1.023 1.099 1.223
exp(δη) 1.008 0.987 0.999 1.008 1.017 1.03
Average length of haul 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.007
Percent unit -0.162 -0.342 -0.235 -0.165 -0.097 0.047
Percent bulk 0.091 -0.069 0.038 0.096 0.149 0.233
Network size 0.107 -0.094 0.008 0.063 0.206 0.395
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APPENDIX B
DECOMPOSING CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY USING BAYESIAN METHODS
Model and Sampling Specifications
Deterministic Trend in Productivity, Constant Technology
As stated in the Empirical Models section, this model assumes productivity follows a
deterministic trend that is shared across all firms. The production technology is common
across firms and is constant through time. The model can be expressed in the following
relations.
qit = αit + xitβ + ϕitθ − δi + εit
αit = αi + τt
αi ∼ N(µα, σα)
εit ∼ N(0, σε)
δi ∼ N+(0, σδ)
I use Gibbs sampling to draw inference on this model and estimate the posterior
distribution of the parameters conditional on the data. This distribution is the likelihood
of the data conditional on the parameters and the following prior assumptions over the
model parameters:
β, θ, µα ∼ N(0, 5)
τ ∼ N(0, 1)
σα, σε, σδ ∼ Γ(1.5, 1)
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These assumptions were chosen to be diffuse with respect to their real world values. For
example, input elasticities are rarely estimated to be greater than five,1 which is just one
standard deviation of the prior distribution.
Conditional on a value for δi, this is a linear random-effects model, which can be
estimated via Gibbs sampling. To draw values of δi conditional on other parameters, first
notice that
p({δi}|{αi}, µα, σα, τ, β, θ, σε, σδ; q, x, ϕ)
∝ p(q|{αi}, τ, β, θ, σε, {δi};x, ϕ)× p({δi}|σδ)
∝∏
i
p(qi|αi, τ, β, θ, σε, δi;xi, ϕi)× p(δi|σδ). (B.3)
Thus, each δi can be drawn in its own independent block. Then, the conditional
distribution of δi is
p(δi|αi, τ, β, θ, σε, δi; qi, xi, ϕi)
∝ p(qi|αi, τ, β, θ, σε, δi;xi, ϕi)× p(δi|σδ). (B.4)
Next,
p(qi|αi, τ, β, θ, σε, δi;xi, ϕi)
∝ exp
(
− 1
2σ2ε
∑
t
(qit − (αi + τt+ xitβ + ϕitθ − δi))2
)
∝ exp
(
− 1
σ2ε
∑
t
(qit − (αi + τt+ xitβ + ϕitθ))δi − 1
2σ2ε
∑
t
δ2i
)
= exp
(
δi
(
− 1
σ2ε
∑
t
(qit − (αi + τt+ xitβ + ϕitθ))
)
+ δ2i
Ç
− T
2σ2ε
å)
. (B.5)
Further, since δi|σ2δ ∼ N+(0, σδ), the normalizing constant of this half-normal distribution
does not depend on δi. Thus,
1As an example, Solow (1957) estimated the elasticity of capital to be 0.353.
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p(δi|σδ) ∝ exp
Ç
− 1
2σ2δ
δ2i
å
; δi ≥ 0. (B.6)
So,
p(δi|αi, τ, β, θ, σε, δi; qi, xi, ϕi)
∝ exp
(
δi
(
− 1
σ2ε
∑
t
(qit − (αi + τt+ xitβ + ϕitθ))
)
+ δ2i
Ç
− T
2σ2ε
− 1
2σ2δ
å)
. (B.7)
This expression can then be factored so that
p(δi|αi, τ, β, θ, σε, δi; qi, xi, ϕi) ∝ exp(− 1
2s2
(δi −m)2),
where
m = − σ
2
δ
Tσ2δ + σ
2
ε
∑
t
(qit − (αi + τt+ xitβ + ϕitθ))
s2 =
σ2δσ
2
ε
Tσ2δ + σ
2
ε
. (B.8)
This is the kernel of a normal distribution with mean m and standard deviation s;
thus, δi|αi, τ, β, θ, σε, δi; qi, xi, ϕi ∼ N+(m, s), so this block can be sampled via rejection
sampling or by directly sampling from a truncated normal distribution.
The posterior distribution of the parameters was estimated using 10,000 warmup
iterations to achieve convergence of the Markov chain and 100,000 iterations to sample
the posterior distribution. Convergence was checked by examining trace plots and
autocorrelation factors. Prior distributions were also varied to ensure prior assumptions
weren’t driving results.
Random Walk in Productivity, Constant Technology
As discussed in the Empirical Models section, this model allows productivity to
follow a more flexible process, a random walk with drift. Each firm is allowed to have its
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own trend in its productivity process. The production technology is still assumed to be
constant across firms and time. The model can be expressed in the following relations:
qit = αit + xitβ + ϕitθ − δi + εit
αit = αit−1 + τi + ηit ; t > 0
αi0 ∼ N(µα, σα)
εit ∼ N(0, σε)
δi ∼ N+(0, σδ)
ηit ∼ N(0, ση)
I once again use a Gibbs sampler to draw values from the posterior distribution of
the parameters conditional on the data. This is complicated by the random walk process
in productivity, but the procedure is outlined in Sarris (1973). Samples of inefficiency
terms δi conditional on other parameters are taken from a half-normal distribution
as described in Section 9.1.1. The posterior distribution is also dependent on prior
assumptions, which are given below.
β, θ, µα ∼ N(0, 5)
τi ∼ N(0, 1)
σα, σε, σδ, ση ∼ Γ(1.5, 1)
The posterior distribution of the parameters was estimated using 10,000 warmup
iterations and 100,000 sampling iterations. Convergence was checked using previously
described methods, and various prior distributions were tested.
Random Walk in Productivity and Technology
This model allows each firm’s productivity as well as the parameters describing the
production technology to follow a random walk with drift. The production technology is
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assumed to be shared across firms, but is allowed to follow a flexible process over time.
The model is expressed in the following relations:
qit = αit + xitβt + ϕitθ − δi + εit
αit = αit−1 + τi + ηit ; t > 0
βt = βt−1 + ρ+ ψt ; t > 0
αi0 ∼ N(µα, σα)
β0 ∼ N(µβ,Σβ)
εit ∼ N(0, σε)
δi ∼ N+(0, σδ)
ηit ∼ N(0, ση)
ψt ∼ N(0,Σψ)
I assume that Σψ and Σβ are diagonal and label the kth diagonal element of each
Σkkψ
2
and Σkkβ
2
. Once again, I draw inefficiency conditional on other parameters using the
method described in Section 9.1.1. I use a Gibbs sampler with 5,000 warmup iterations
and 50,000 sampling iterations to draw inference on the parameters. Prior assumptions
over the parameters are given below.
θ, µα, µβ ∼ N(0, 5)
τi ∼ N(0, 1)
ρ ∼ N(0, I)
σα,Σ
kk
β , σε, σδ, ση,Σ
kk
ψ ∼ Γ(1.5, 1)
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